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Going After Pat Buchanan: Americanism and
Anti-Semitism
By William Halvorsen
The publication of Pat Buchanan's
book, A Republic, Not an Empire, coming with Buchanan's
departure from the Republican Party in order to seek the presidential
nomination of the Reform Party, has created the opportunity for
Buchanan's critics to come crawling out of the woodwork with the
usual arguments concerning the supposed anti-Semitism and extremism
of the conservative Catholic columnist.
The most controversial claim in Buchanan's book
is that Hitler had no designs on Western Europe or even the United
States, which suggests that World War Two didn't need our participation,
and that Private Ryan could have just as well stayed home.
This had led to a number of hysterical attacks in which Buchanan
has been smeared as a Hitler lover and as an anti-Semite, and these
attacks in turn involve going back 20 years or more to find comments
that Buchanan made here or there that can be used to facilitate
the recent campaign of demonization. What we will do here is cover
some of the themes that support the most recent assaults: the defense
of John Demjanjuk, Buchanan's opposition to the Gulf War, and the
canard that he is a "Hitler apologist."
Demajanjuk and Diesel Engines
The first major component of
the ongoing attacks goes back to Buchanan's courageous defense of
Ivan Demjanjuk, the retired Cleveland auto worker who was sentenced
to death by an Israeli court in 1988 for being the notorious "Ivan
the Terrible" at the Treblinka concentration camp, where he supposedly
operated gas chambers fed with diesel fumes.
The Demjanjuk affair was probably a high profile
case of the Jimmy Carter appointed Office of Special Investigations
(OSI), a unit that was set up for the purposes of tracking down
Nazi war criminals who were supposedly living in the United States.
In its 20 year existence, the OSI, usually following evidence provided
by communist or former communist governments, has dogged the last
days of dozens of American citizens who came from Eastern Europe,
and in the case of Demjanjuk, almost contributed to his death.
Buchanan's defense of Demjanjuk was simple. If Demjanjuk
was guilty of a crime, let him be tried as an American in America.
On the other hand, if he was to be tried, let the evidence against
him be reviewed with skepticism, without undue acceptance of the
value of materials provided to the OSI by the Soviet secret police.
Buchanan had a number of reasons to be skeptical of the case that
went far beyond the accusation of OSI-KGB collaboration. Earlier
cases that had been mishandled by the OSI include the cases of Frank
Walus and Ivan Stebelsky, both of whom had been "positively" identified
as death camp guards by survivors, and both of whom were financially
ruined in their costly defenses against the limitless funds of the
government-sponsored OSI. The cases against both men were eventually
dropped, which suggested recklessness on the part of a government
agency. Another factor which Buchanan mentioned hinged on the fact
that the "documentary" evidence against Demjanjuk had been identified
as false by several independent analysts.
After several years of wrangling, Demjanjuk was
stripped of his citizenship and was sent to Israel in 1986, where
he was put on trial for his life two years later. The prosecution's
case rested almost entirely on "eyewitness" testimonies, since the
documents were easily debunked, and the court's final guilty verdict,
delivered in a converted theater, featured a moment of high drama,
with the enraged crowd shouting "Death! Death!" while the elderly
Ukrainian grandfather instinctively reached up to his chest and
unobtrusively made the sign of the cross.
If not for the further publicity efforts of Buchanan,
whose role was similar to that of Zola in the Dreyfus Affair, and
the courageous efforts of two Jewish Israeli lawyers, Dov Eitan
and Yoram Sheftel, Demjanjuk may well have been hanged. But further
investigation revealed, not only that Demjanjuk was not "Ivan the
Terrible", but that the Office of Special Investigation had withheld
this exculpatory evidence for years. As a result, Demjanjuk was
exonerated and allowed to return to his family in Ohio in late 1993.
The price paid for justice in this case was considerable.
Dov Eitan died under mysterious circumstances in which he fell twenty
stories from an apartment building, supposedly by accident, and
Yoram Sheftel was temporarily blinded with sulphuric acid while
attending Eitan's funeral. Buchanan, on the other hand, escaped
such physical violence, but has never been forgiven for being right
about Demjanjuk.
The one element of Buchanan's defense that his critics
have seized on goes back to an article that he wrote in March, 1990,
when he pointed out that, among other things, the diesel engines
that were supposedly used at Treblinka to gas hundreds of thousands
of people could not have been used: diesels emit very little carbon
monoxide, and in fact rather high quantities of oxygen. Whether
or not Buchanan is right on this point -- revisionists tend to think
he is right, following the analyses of Fritz Berg -- the fact remains
that his critics have never attempted to refute the argument itself,
but have simply responded by calling Buchanan a "Holocaust denier".
The Gulf War and the Amen Corner
Another prominent element in
the attacks on Buchanan go back to his advocacy of a wait-and-see
attitude after the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq's Saddam Hussein.
Buchanan, never interested in seeing Americans getting killed fighting
someone else's war, had said on television on August 26, 1990, just
a few weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that "There are
only two groups that are beating the drums for war in the The Middle
East -- the Israeli Defense Ministry and its amen corner in the
United States."
Buchanan elaborated on these comments a bit more
in a newspaper column that appeared three days later. "'The civilized
world must win this fight' the editors thunder. But, if it comes
to war, it will not be the 'civilized world' humping up that bloody
road to Baghdad, it will be American kids, with names like McAllister,
Murphy, Gonzales, and Leroy Brown."
Offhand, there doesn't seem to be anything particularly
offensive about the above quote, especially when one considers,
in context, that Buchanan was responding to the call of the British
editor of The Economist for the "civilized world" to stop Hussein.
But Buchanan's critics, already incensed by his "diesels cannot
kill" column of just six months before, claimed that there was an
anti-Semitic subtext to the article. That bizarre claim rests on
the fact that Buchanan four days earlier and in a completely different
context had mentioned the names Abe Rosenthal , Richard Perle, Charles
Krauthammer, and Henry Kissinger among those who were calling for
war, all of whom, apparently, are Jewish.
The weird contortions that his critics went through
in this case in order to make Buchanan out as an "anti-Semite" simply
goes to show just how baseless these charges really are. The "Amen
corner" crack may have been hyperbolic, but certainly no one wants
to pretend that Israel was not itching to take down Saddam, or that
the Israeli oriented lobbying groups in the United States were defending
what they perceived as Israel's interests in typical knee-jerk fashion.
The same can be said about the claim, first dredged up around this
time, that Buchanan was some kind of "Hitler lover" based on some
positive comments he made in the context of reviewing John Toland's
biography of Hitler in 1977.
The irony, which strikes one as ridiculous, is that
Buchanan has always been a staunch supporter of Israel, and of the
conservative ideology that has always justified not only the existence
of Israel but also Israel's frequent use of force against its enemies,
real, perceived, or imaginary. To say, under any circumstances,
that Buchanan is somehow opposed to Jewish interests in general,
or to the State of Israel in particular, is simply absurd.
A Republic, Not an Empire
All of these past issues regarding
Buchanan and Jews have resurfaced because of some of the arguments
that Buchanan makes in his recent A Republic, Not an Empire.
Buchanan's thesis is relatively simple. America was never meant
to be the world's policeman, and it goes against our interests to
try and play that role. To make his argument, Buchanan goes over
the entire course of American foreign policy from the American Revolution
to show how the United States, in the 20th Century, began to play
an interventionist role contrary to the ideas of the Founders.
Of course, much of what Buchanan has to say about
American foreign policy in the 20th Century is not going to be questioned.
The blatant imperialism of the Spanish-American War, with its echoes
of atrocity in the Philippines, won't arouse any opposition, nor
will his description of the tragic futility of Vietnam. Since it
is accepted by virtually everyone nowadays that World War One set
the stage for the Second World War, and that the first war was fought
blindly, and foolishly, and resulted in a peace that satisfied no
one, there are not likely to be many that will quarrel with his
characterization of that conflict, either. In fact, the current
trend, exemplified in Niall Ferguson's recent history, is that the
Western World may well have been better off if not only the United
States but Great Britain had stayed out of a Russo-German-French
war: in that case, we would have probably ended up with a German-dominated
European Union just as we have today but without the tremendous
loss of life.
Only when Buchanan touches on the shibboleths of
Franklin Roosevelt, and the "necessity" of going to war to stop
Hitler and the Holocaust that his critics have gone over the edge.
Again, Buchanan's arguments are simple and frankly
somewhat similar to Ferguson's but applied to a different war. Germany's
foreign policy aims, ever since the 1880's, were to extend German
influence into Eastern Europe, a region where several millions German
ethnics lived. It was wrong for the Western governments to perceive
Germany -- whether under the Kaiser or under Hitler -- as a threat
to their interests. Furthermore, in the 1930's, there were other
factors in play.
Millions of Germans had been denied the right to
self-determination at Versailles. The Soviet Union was under the
heel of Stalinist madness, and several of the governments of Eastern
Europe were fascist or proto-fascist and were actively engaged in
persecuting their minorities, including Jews. The Anglo-French guarantee
of Polish neutrality, which came in March of 1939, was unenforceable,
and only guaranteed that another German war would necessarily become
a world war.
What happened next proved the point. Hitler and
Stalin made a deal to divide Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe
in August, 1939. Germany invaded Poland a week later, and within
a matter of months, the entire region was under either Nazi or Communist
rule. Meanwhile, neither the French nor the British were able to
do anything to save Poland, other than declare war on Germany (they
did not declare war on the Soviet Union for taking about 40% of
Poland's territory.) In the end, America's participation did nothing
to save Poland or the rest of Eastern Europe from fifty years of
communist dictatorship
Contrary to his critics, there is a considerable
body of scholarly opinion that can be cited to defend Buchanan's
interpretations. There are a number of historians who now concede
that Germany's interest was in Eastern expansion, not world war,
and there are also a number of historians who grant that the Holocaust
itself was contingent on the failures the Germans encountered during
the war (the so-called "functionalist" school of Holocaust historians.)
In fact, it has recently come to be accepted that the German plan
to deport the Jewish population from Europe to a Jewish homeland
was still seriously considered in the Third Reich until the summer
of 1941. The inevitable conclusion would appear to be that, if Hitler
had won the European war, the Jewish people would have suffered
far less than they in fact did.
Among the reactions was the remark of Deborah Lipstadt
(author of Denying the Holocaust), who claims that
Buchanan's argument "is a serious distortion of history because
it shifts part of the blame for the Holocaust of 6 million Jews
to the Allies" which is totally gratuitous. Buchanan says nothing
about the Holocaust in his book. Still another non sequitur was
offered by Walter Reich, former head of the USHMM, who said that
Buchanan was practically an Anti-Semite because in 1990 he had written
that diesel engines did not provide enough carbon monoxide to gas
human being en masse. The best that can be said is that Buchanan's
critics are consistent, consistent in their use of slogans instead
of reason, and consistent in using irrelevancies to advance their
specious accusations of anti-Semitism.
Conclusion
Pat Buchanan is a leading force
of traditional and conservative thought in the United States. He
has always called things as he saw them, and he has played a leading
role in conservative attempts to inject some sanity in American
politics, dominated as it is by a mindless "multiculturalism", by
global rejections of traditional standards of morality and personal
behavior, and by a reckless disregard for the truths upon which
Western Civilization evolved. As a defender of the past, Buchanan
puts himself squarely on the side of continuity, but he also leavens
his reactionary tendencies by a disarming directness and humanity
that shows his training in the Catholic faith. Not bad people, but
bad and stupid ideas, are the enemies that he tirelessly exposes
in his columns, his books, and his frequent television appearances.
Only the narrowest perspective can see his energetic advocacy as
"extremist", only those who derive satisfaction from trotting out
vulgar platitudes and their own pet prejudices would smear his perceptive
and original analyses as "anti-Semitic." The ultimate result of
continually using such maledictions against an American of Pat Buchanan's
caliber will be to put such terms into disrepute. Along with their
authors.
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