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I-THE AREA UNDER BRITISH OCCUPATION
(O. E. T. A. SOUTH)
1. Narrative.-Owing to changes of plan at a late date, the commission
arrived in Jaffa at a time when the British authorities were not expecting
it, and the program followed there was arranged mainly without their help.
The endeavor was made to ascertain the opinions and desires of every important
group, sect, and organization, of a few well-informed representative individuals,
and of significant minorities or sub-divisions, especially in cases where
there seemed to be disposition, for any reason, to suppress these. Because
of the numerous sub-divisions of the Christians and particularly of the
Roman Catholics, it was inevitable that from the beginning the commission
would give a disproportionate number of interviews and amount of time to
them. The commissioners had prepared a statement of their purposes, to be
found elsewhere in this report, which was read to important groups, and
given to the press in lieu of interviews. Care was taken to make it clear,
in response to frequent questioning, that the policy of the United States
in regard to accepting a mandate anywhere was unformed and unpredictable,
and that the commission had no power of decision. Automobiles were secured
from the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, in order to be
as little as possible dependent upon others than Americans. Word was given
out that the commission would not accept general social invitations or consent
to demonstrations.
On leaving Jaffa the commission stopped at two Jewish schools and took
luncheon at the Hichon-le-Sion colony, where it met the chief men of several
Jewish colonies, as well as the members of the central Zionist Commission.
A week was spent in Jerusalem, with two days out for visiting Bethlehem,
Hebron, and Beersheba. A limited amount of hospitality was accepted in a
quiet way from the British and French officials. In order that none might
be offended the heads of the various religious groups were received, although
some of them, as for instance the Copts and Abyssinians had little to say
along the line of the inquiry
After leaving Jerusalem, a rapid journey was made through northern Palestine,
delegations being received at Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Haifa and
Acre. At most of these places groups came in, not only front the surrounding
country, but from other administrative centers which it was impossible to
visit.
2. THE ATTITUDE OF THE OCCUPYING GOVERNMENT.-The British officials, from
Major General Sir Arthur Money, who was in command of O. E. T. A. South,
down to the youngest officer, were courteous, obliging, and helpful. Most
of them had had Indian, Egyptian, or Soudanese experience before the Great
War. As a body they gave an impression of ability, efficiency, and a serious
effort to administer the country for the good of the people.
It should be noted here that General Allenby detailed to accompany the
commission as aid Lt. Col. J. K. Watson, who had served for years in a similar
capacity with Lord Kitchener and later with the Khedive of Egypt. His thoughtfulness,
kindness, and efficiency though the circumstances of travel were often trying,
were unfailing, and the comfort, good health, and success in the investigation
of the Commission were largely furthered by him.
3. Wishes of the People.-The Moslems constitute about four-fifths
of the actual population of Palestine, according to a recent British census.
Except for certain official groups they were practically unanimous for the
independence of United Syria, and were responsive to the current political
influences. The organizations met at Jaffa took the position that Syria
is capable of self-government without a mandatory power, but if one should
be insisted upon by the Peace Conference, they preferred the United States.
At Jerusalem, however, and in all other places in Palestine, the program
of independence was affirmed. For the most part, the question of a mandate
was referred, either in writing, or more often in response to questions,
to the approaching Syrian Congress at Damascus, at which they would have
representation. Some Moslems, especially in the South, maintained emphatically
that they could accept no mandate whatever. It is evident that since the
Damascus Congress later declared for American assistance, with the British
as second choice, and emphatic refusal of the French,: this is the program
to which the great majority of the Moslems of Palestine are committed. Probably
most of them had it in mind when they declared for reference to Damascus.
The Christians of Palestine, who altogether constitute less than ten
per cent of the population, showed more difference of opinion. Some groups
in the north, as the Latin Catholics of Tiberias and Haifa and most of the
Christians of Nazareth, were with the Moslems for independence and the reference
to Damascus. Maronites and Greek Catholics, and usually the Latin Catholics,
were for a French mandate. The Greek Orthodox everywhere, according to an
agreed program, were for a British mandate, as were several scattering groups.
None asked directly for the United States, though the opinion was expressed
that if there were assurance that we would come if asked, most Christians
would favor this solution. The Christians were in general strongly in favor
of a mandatory power, which should exercise a real control. The Jews, who
constitute a little more than ten per cent of the population, were all for
Zionism, under a British mandate. The Moslem and Christian population was
practically unanimous against Zionism, usually expressing themselves with
great emphasis. This question was closely connected with that of the unity
of all Syria under one Government.
4. Zionism.-The Jews of Palestine declared themselves unanimously
in favor of the Zionistic scheme in general, though they showed difference
of opinion in regard to the details and the process of its realization.
The elements of agreement may be stated as follows:
(a) Palestine, with a fairly large area, to be set aside at once as a
"national home" for the Jews.
(b) Sooner or later the political rule of the land will become organized
as a "Jewish Commonwealth,"
(c) At the start authorization will be given for the free immigration
of Jews from any part of the world; for the unrestricted purchase of land
by the Jews, and for the recognition of Hebrew as an official language.
(d) Great Britain will be the mandatory power over Palestine, protecting
the Jews and furthering the realization of the scheme.
(e) The Great Powers of the world have declared in favor of the scheme,
which merely awaits execution.
Differences exist especially along two lines:
(a) Whether the Jewish Commonwealth should be set up soon or after a
considerable lapse of time.
(b) Whether the chief emphasis should be upon a restoration of the ancient
mode of life, ritual, exclusiveness and particularism of the Jews, or upon
economic development in a thoroughly modern fashion, with afforestation,
electrification of water-power, and general full utilization of resources.
5. The Custody of the Holy Places.-For four centuries the Turk
has served as guardian of the peace between Moslems, Christians and Jews,
and even between the different sects of each, in the Holy Land. Nor has
his function been merely nominal: being really a foreigner and having upon
himself the responsibility of government, he has on the whole well maintained
the status quo, or policed slow and delicate changes in one direction or
another. Now that his authority is gone, a substitute must be provided,
whatever be the new regime. This might be the mandatory power. If, however,
any Roman Catholic power should receive the mandate, trouble would arise
from the fact than at present the Catholics feel unfairly treated and claim
increase of privilege at the expense of the Greek Orthodox. A Catholic power
would be tempted promptly to disturb the equilibrium, especially during
the eclipse of the power of Russia.
There is already a "Custodian of the Holy Places" for the Roman
Catholics. Might not this idea be extended to the constitution of a permanent
Commission for the Holy Places, on which might be placed this man, and representatives
of Greek Orthodox Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Sunnite Islam,
Shiite Islam, and Judaism? The Commission might be given authority and means
to guard and care for all the places in Palestine that are sacred to the
three religions, and to adjudicate all disputes about their custody. Its
composition should ensure conservatism and promote harmony.
II-THE AREA UNDER FRENCH OCCUPATION
1. The Commission reached Beirut after having visited Palestine and the
southern half of the territory occupied by the Arab forces. Two days were
spent in interviews in the city, and visits were paid by automobile to points
from Tyre to Batrun. General Allenby was kind enough to place his yacht
the "Maid of Honor" at the disposal of the Commission, and thus
Tripoli, Alexandretta and Ladikiya were seen. Delegations were thus heard
from every part of O. E. T A. West. Arrangements as to program, demonstrations,
and the like, were in general maintained as in other areas. The French officials
were at great pains to arrange suitably for the hearings of the Commission,
and to provide for its comfort and well-being.
The women of the Moslem Trades School at Beirut had woven a rug for presentation
to the Peace Conference, which is interesting as being a map, patterned
so as to show the area claimed by Syrian Nationalists for United Syria.
2. Wishes of the People.-In general the situation was in accordance
with that in Palestine and the Damascus area. With few exceptions the Moslems
were for American or British assistance according to the "Damascus
Program"; the Druses were for an English Mandate, the Maronites and
all varieties of Catholics were for France. But the Greek Orthodox were
divided, instead of standing for a British Mandate as usually in Palestine
and Damascus. The Ismailians were mostly for France, and the Nusairiyeh
were divided.
Those who stood for a French Mandate were of different opinions as regards
the place and relationship of Lebanon in Syria. From Tyre to Tripoli they
mostly followed a rigid formula which calls for a Greater Lebanon, absolutely
independent of the rest of Syria, and under France; the supporters of this
view showed no response to the idea of Syrian national unity, and apparently
wish to become French citizens at an early moment.
Others desire the unity of Syria under the French Mandate, preferring
ordinarily that the Lebanon District should be enlarged and given a high
degree of autonomy.
In the Lebanon proper the majority is probably sincerely for a French,
as opposed to a British mandate. The Commission could not inquire whether
those who declared for France were well disposed toward an American Mandate,
in case this were possible and a French Mandate for any reason undesirable;
but there were a number of emphatic assurances that the great majority of
the population, including even the Maronites, prefers America to any other;
this is said to be based upon America's unselfish part in the war, her generosity
before and after the armistice, and the personal relationships established
by the large number of Lebanese who have gone to live for shorter or longer
periods in the United States and to return home loyal.
The Druses ask emphatically to be left out of the Lebanon in case it
be given to France,
But outside the Lebanon proper, in the areas which it is proposed to
include in the "Greater Lebanon," such as Tyre, Sidon, "Hollow
Syria," and Tripoli, a distinct majority of the people is probably
averse to French rule. This includes practically all the Sunnite Moslems,
most of the Shiites, a part of the Greek Orthodox Christians, and the small
group of Protestants. Most of these ask earnestly for America, with Britain
as second choice; the balance for Britain with America as second choice.
In the rest of the O.E.T.A. West, north of the proposed Greater Lebanon,
the majority is probably against a French Mandate in any circumstances.
A considerable proportion of the remainder are averse to a separation from
the interior of the country, and place the unity of Syria above their preference
for France.
It is worthy of note that whereas the Syrian nationalists everywhere
distinctly and by name rejected the assistance of France, no one who supported
France declared for a specific rejection of England or America. In a number
of instances, however, the fear was expressed by Christians that England,
if made the mandatory power, would show more favor to Moslems than to Christians.
3. The Lebanon.---The mountainous area set off in 1861 to be under
the nominal protection of six European powers, with a Christian governor,
has been a particular interest of France ever since. The population is largely
Maronite and Roman Catholic. As in the case of all regions that have been
removed from the direct jurisdiction of the Porte, progress has been comparatively
rapid; roads have been built, trees planted, and a large number of stone
houses erected. Money earned in America has helped greatly in these improvements.
The Maronite ecclesiastical and monastic organizations have increased greatly
in wealth in these years
The Lebanon has been freed from the burden of military service, and taxes
have consequently been light. The area has been predominantly Christian
and the Christians have enjoyed rather more than their proportion of the
offices. Druses on the other hand have shown a tendency to emigrate to join
their brethren in the Hauran, and they resent the inequalities of treatment
to which they have been subjected.
The French policy of "colonization" shows its fruits in many
inhabitants of this area, as well as of Beirut and other parts of Syria,
who feel that they know French better than Arabic, and who are apt to hold
themselves as of a distinctly higher order of civilization than the people
of the interior. It is among these that the idea of a complete political
separation of the Lebanese area from the rest of Syria has taken root.
The propinquity of this area led the Turkish government to be lenient
and favorable to Christians and others in adjacent regions, so that no very
sharp line of difference of prosperity is visible. Nevertheless the appeal
of lighter taxes and military service, greater security and opportunities
for office-holding has an effect upon Christians in neighboring areas, so
that many of them incline toward a Greater Lebanon under a permanent French
mandate. But there is a considerable party, even among the pro-French, who
are opposed to becoming a part of France. This is in fact the official Maronite
position.
Any revision of the situation should not diminish the security of the
inhabitants of the Lebanon, but should raise the rest of Syria to a like
security. This can be provided for in a United Syria by a sufficient measure
of local autonomy. Care should be taken to avoid leaving this portion of
the country in a position of perpetual special privilege, in which the common
burdens would rest more heavily on other areas.
III-THE AREA UNDER ARAB OCCUPATION
1. The Commission spent nine days in Damascus, six of which were filled
up with interviews, held with representatives of religious and political
groups, councils and boards of the Government, and prominent officials and
other notable persons of every grade, including even the Emir Feisal and
General Allenby. More time was spent here than anywhere else in Syria, because
Damascus will he the capital of United Syria, if such be created, and an
Arab government over O. E. T. A. East is already in operation there, showing
much activity and endeavoring by accomplishment, display, and intrigue to
prepare the way for the larger unity. During the Commission's visit, the
"Syrian Congress" met, whose charter and program are described
below. The bazars were placarded with the signs "We want absolute independence,"
and these were removed by government orders. The interview of the Commission
with the Mufti, Radi, and Ulema was published with considerable accuracy
in the local newspapers (of course by no act or permission of the Commission)
and this gave rise to animated discussions on the part of the people and
the press. The Commission accepted hospitality from the Emir Feisal on two
occasions.
In the midst of the stay in Damascus a trip was taken southward to Amman
and Deraa for the purpose of conferring with people from the edge of the
desert. The note received from all Moslems was for complete independence
without protection or a mandatory power; but recognizing that they need
financial and economic advice, they proposed after the recognition of independence
to ask advisers from America. Eloquent Arab orators appealed to America,
as having freed them, to uphold their independence before the Peace Conference,
saying that they hold our country responsible before God for completing
the work we have begun. The Christians, who are few in these areas, were
in great fear. They desire that a strong mandatory power be appointed over
Syria, so that they may have full protection; they prefer that Britain be
that power, and that the area be annexed to and governed with Palestine.
After leaving Damascus, a day was spent at Baalbek, where was encountered
first the struggle for and against annexing "Hollow Syria" (known
as the Bekaa) to the Greater Lebanon. After ten days in O. E. T. A. West,
the Arab area was entered again by the road from Tripoli to Homs. Delegations
were heard at Homs and Hama, after which three days were spent in Aleppo.
Besides hearing delegations of all important Allepine groups and opinions,
visits were paid to the centers of relief for refugee Armenians.
The claim for the independence of Mesopotamia was presented very vigorously
in the north. Certain groups at Aleppo were much interested, however, in
pushing the boundary of Syria well to the east, so as to include the Syrian
desert.
2. Attitude of the Occupying Government. -The higher Arab officials
include a number of men of dignity, ability, intelligence, and apparent
honesty and patriotism. Practically all are Syrian born. Some of them, as
General Haddad Pasha, chief of police and gendarmerie, and Said Pasha Zoucair,
financial adviser, have been trained under British Administration in Egypt,
and others, as Col. Yussef Bey, aide-de-camp of the Emir Feisal, General
Jaafar Pasha, Military Governor of Aleppo, and Ihsan Allah Djabri, Mayor
of Aleppo, have had their education and experience in the Turkish service.
Most of the lower officials in this area (as well as in the other O. E.
T. A. regions) have simply been continued from the Turkish regime, and in
many cases are said to practice extortions and malversations much as under
the former Government.
Every effort was made to do honor to the Commission and execute its wishes.
Sometimes ostentatious attempts were made to give the impression of absolute
non-interference with freedom of access to an expression before the Commission.
3. Wishes of the People.- The declarations in O. E. T. A. East
were much nearer to unanimity than in the South or the West, as may be seen
by a glance at the Tables of "Petition Summaries." The greater
part of the declarations both oral and written. conformed to the resolutions
of the Syrian Congress at Damascus, which is discussed separately below.
This program was reached by the action of conflicting forces, in the presence
of a general feeling that it was overwhelmingly important for reasons of
national safety to reach unity of expression. The pressure brought to bear
by the Government and the different political parties was of undoubted weight
in bringing into line opinions of a more extreme sort, such as those in
favor of independence in the highest degree and those which called for a
perpetual strong mandatory control. But on the whole there can be no doubt
that the main elements of this program represent the popular will as nearly
as that can be expressed in any country.
The people of the area declared themselves almost unanimously for United
Syria, for its complete independence, and against any help from France,
and against the Zionist program. The Moslems were in nearly unanimous agreement
upon a request for American assistance. The Jews asked for autonomy for
themselves, and the Zionist scheme for their brethren in Palestine. The
Druses were for the Arab Government under a British mandate. The Christians
were divided, partly by sects and partly by geographical location. All of
the few Christians in the south, including Latin Catholics were for a British
mandate, with America in case for any reason Britain cannot come. So also
were the Greek Orthodox of Damascus and a portion of the Greek Orthodox
farther north. The small groups of Protestants were for an Anglo-Saxon mandate,
some preferring America and some Britain. The Orthodox Syrians were for
America. All the Catholics (except at Amman and Deraa) and the Maronites
were for France. Nearly all of the Christians were for a strong mandatory
control.
4. The Syrian Congress at Damascus.- From the time of reaching
Jerusalem, the Commission began to be told of a congress that was in preparation,
to be held soon at Damascus, which would for a large part of the population
determine the question of a mandate. Sessions were held while the Commission
was at Damascus, and on the last day there, a deputation presented to the
Commission the program that had been prepared.
The Congress was not elected directly by the people, or by a fresh appeal
to the people, the reason given being that time was lacking to revise the
voting lists and carry through a new scheme. At the last Turkish election,
before the war, electors were chosen to select deputies for the Turkish
parliament. The survivors of these electors chose the members of the Damascus
Congress. Criticisms were made against the plan of choice to the effect
that it was unconstitutional and extra-constitutional, that the electors
had mostly belonged to the Party of Union and Progress, and that the members
of the Congress were not distributed in proportion to population. Sixty-nine
members attended, and about 20 others from the west and north had been elected,
but bad not arrived. There were a number of Christians in the Conference,
but no Jews, though some Jews among the electors were said to have given
their approval. Much evidence goes to show that the program prepared represents
well the wishes of the people of Syria. The program is as follows:
"We, the undersigned, members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting
in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2, 1919, made up of representatives from
the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided with
credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts,
Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement
of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present
them to the American Section of the International Commission; the fifth
article was passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were
accepted unanimously.
"1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria
within these boundaries. The Taurus System on the North; Rafeh and a line
running from Al-Juf to the south of the Syrian and the Mejazian line to
Akaba on the south; the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers and a line extending
east of Abu Kamal to the east of Al-Juf on the east; and the Mediterranean
on the west
"2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be
a democratic civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles,
safeguarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal
who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited
our full confidence and entire reliance.
"3 Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area
are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that;
they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks,
and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the
nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory
power.
"4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this
just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand, we,
relying on the declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging
war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can
only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations
as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that
does not prejudice our complete independence. And desiring that our country
should not fall a prey to colonization and believing that the American
Nation is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no political
ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economic assistance
from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not
exceed twenty years.
"5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to
accept our desire for assistance we will seek this assistance from Great
Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete
independence and unity of our country, and that the duration of such assistance
does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.
"6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government
in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist
us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.
"7. We oppose the pretentions of the Zionists to create a Jewish
commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose
Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge
their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national,
economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall
enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.
"8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part
of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone which includes
Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country
should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.
"9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and
that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries.
"10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in
condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against
any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against
any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern
part of Syria, therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions
and agreements.
"The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson strengthen
our confidence that our desires emanating from the depths of our hearts,
shall be the decisive factor in determining our future; and that President
Wilson and the free American people will be supporters for the realization
of our hopes, thereby proving their sincerity and noble sympathy with the
aspiration of the weaker nations in general and our Arab people in particular.
"We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference
will realize that we would not have risen against the Turks, with whom
we had participated in all civil, political, and representative privileges,
but for their violation of our national rights, and so will grant us our
desires in full in order that our political rights may not be less after
the war than they were before, since we have shed so much blood in the
cause of our liberty and independence.
"We request to he allowed to send a delegation to represent us
at the Peace Conference to defend our rights and secure the realization
of our aspirations."
The program mostly speaks sufficiently for itself. Various points in
it are commented upon elsewhere in this report. It is the most substantial
document presented to the Commission, and deserves to be treated with great
respect. The result of an extensive and arduous political process, it affords
a basis on which the Syrians can get together, and as firm a foundation
for a Syrian national organization as can be obtained. The mandatory power
will possess in this program a commitment to liberal government which will
be found to be very valuable in starting the new state in the right direction.
CILICIA
1. General-
(a) The Commission did not endeavor to give thorough hearings in this
region, feeling that it is not seriously to be considered a part of Syria,
and desiring not to open up as yet the question of the Turkish-speaking
portion of the former Turkish Empire.
(b) The population statistics vary considerably, but there can be no
doubt of a marked Moslem majority in Cilicia before the war, now probably
somewhat increased.
2. Wishes of the People
(a) The Turks here, like most of those heard previously, wish to retain
Turkish unity under the house of Osman, and leave the question of what
shall be the Mandatory Power, if any, to the Turkish Government at Constantinople.
(b) The Arabs (who are mainly Turkish-speaking, but are chiefly Nusairiyeh
or Alouites) ask for union with Syria under a French mandate.
(d) The other Christians, a small minority are mostly for France, particularly
the Greeks who are working in close relation with the French in the northern
regions of Turkey.
(c) The Armenians (who are also chiefly Turkish-speaking) ask for the
union of Cilicia with Armenia under an American mandate.
(d) The other Christians, a small minority, are mostly for France, particularly
the Greeks who are working in close relation with the French in the northern
regions of Turkey.
MESOPOTAMIA
It was impossible for the Commission to visit Mesopotamia at this time.
Earnest requests to make such a visit were presented at Damascus and Aleppo,
accompanied by complaints that the British occupying forces are restricting
freedom of speech, movement, and political action, and that they show signs
of an intention to allow extensive immigration from India, to the great
detriment of the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the region.
A committee at Aleppo presented a program for Mesopotamia which parallels
closely the "Damascus Program" for Syria. An abstract of their
claims follows:
1. Mesopotamia should be completely independent, including Diarbekir,
Deir-ez-Zor, Mosul, Bagdad, and Muhammerah.
2. The Government should be a constitutional civil kingdom.
3. The king should be a son of the King of the Hejaz, either Abdullah
or Zeid.
4. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is protested against.
5. No outside government should interfere in the country.
6. After the recognition of independence technical and economical assistance
is to be asked for from America
7. Objection is raised to all immigration and especially to that of Hindus
and Jews.
8. The complete independence of Syria is asked for.
9. It is asked that there be no interference of France in Syria.
It will be noticed that conformably to the custom of all nascent nations,
wide boundaries are claimed, which would involve difficulties with adjacent
areas, such as Deir-ez-Zor with Syria, Diarbekir with Armenia, and Muhammerah
with Persia.
The Orthodox [Nestorian?-Ed.] Syrian Patriarch, from Der Zafran, near
Mardin, met the Commission at Homs. He stated that 90,000 of his people
were slain in 1915; when the British came in 1918, all were willing to submit
to their rule; but emissaries came from Constantinople to stir up the Kurds
and Arabs in favor of independence, and now the situation is much worse,
the area occupied by his people should go with Mesopotamia, under the mandate
of either America or Britain.
The entire data have been given, thus so fully as to make it possible
to test at every point the legitimacy of the inference drawn from the data,
and of the final recommendations for action by the Peace Conference.
Further data from our final inference and recommendations were afforded
by comprehensive reports of the entire survey, made by all three advisers.
The recommendations of the Commissioners have thus been shaped in the light
of surveys made from different points of view, and taking into account a
wide range of considerations-local, national racial, and religious considerations
both of principle and of practical policy; and of the world's dire need
of a peace everywhere justly and so permanently based.
II-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Commissioners have sought to make their survey of Syria, and the
report upon Syria now submitted, in the spirit of the instructions given
them by the Council of Four, and especially in harmony with the resolutions
adopted on January 30, 1919, by the Representatives of the United States,
Great Britain France, Italy and Japan, and with the Anglo-French Declaration
of November 9, 1918, both quoted at length in the Commission's instructions.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth of the resolutions adopted on
January 30th are particularly pertinent to this report, and should be here
recorded. The general purpose of the Peace Conference Concerning these areas
in the former Turkish Empire is here clearly disclosed.
2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical
mis-government by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres
of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers
are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be
completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to
the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.
3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should
be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these
colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which
are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust
of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should
be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.
4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving
practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples
should he entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources,
their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this
responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories
on behalf of the League of Nations.
5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character
of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the
people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions,
and other similar circumstances.
6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able
to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration
in the selection of the mandatory power....
In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League
of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its
charge.
The Anglo-French Declaration [Note: This Charter of Freedom, issued
a few days prior to the Armistice, is the standard by which the Near East
judges the post-Armistice conduct of Europe.] was spread broadcast throughout
Syria and Mesopotamia, and, as bearing directly upon our problem, may also
well be called to mind at this point:
The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in
the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final
liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment
of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from
the initiative and free choice of the native population.
In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain
have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments
and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies,
and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have
agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established.
So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations
of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective
assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions
of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function
which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories
is to insure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic
development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the
diffusion of education; and to put an end to the division too long exploited
by Turkish policy.
Of this Declaration, M. Pichon very properly said in the French Chamber
December 29, 1918: "Of course we admit the complete freedom of the
Conference, and its right to give these agreements their proper conclusions,
but these agreements are binding both upon England and upon us." This
statement is the more significant because it is exactly these two peoples
of the Allies who are immediately related to the problems in the Arabic-speaking
portions of the Turkish Empire. Our survey made it clear that this Anglo-French
Declaration and similar utterances of the Peace Conference, and President
Wilson's Fourteen Points, had made a deep impression upon the Syrian people
and lay in the background of all their demands. The promises involved not
only cannot justly be ignored by the Peace Conference, but should be faithfully
fulfilled. This is particularly true of the British-French Declaration;
for it is completely in accord with the repeated statements of the aims
of the Allies, and was expressly directed to the Arabic-speaking portions
of the Turkish Empire especially Syria and Mesopotamia.
It is noted that these resolutions of January 30, 1919, and this Declaration
of November 9, 1918, clearly look to complete separation of the Arabic-speaking
areas from Turkey propose that Syria and Mesopotamia shall not be colonies
in the old sense at all; shall not be exploited for the benefit of the occupying
power; but shall rather be directly encouraged and assisted in developing
national independence as quickly as possible. And the Declaration makes
the promises equally binding for Syria and Mesopotamia.
The resolutions and declaration invoked in the instructions given to
our Commission thus form the basis of the whole policy of sending a Commission,
and of ascertaining the desires of the people.
The sincerity of the professed aims of the Allies in the war, therefore,
is peculiarly to be tested in the application of these aims in the treatment
of the Arabic-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire. For the promises
here made were specific and unmistakable. It is worth consideration, too,
that the whole policy of mandatories under the League of Nations might here
be worked out with special success, and success here would encourage the
steady extension of the policy elsewhere, and do something so significant
for world progress as to help to justify the immeasurable sacrifices of
the war. There is also probably no region where the Allies are freer to
decide their course in accordance with the principles they have professed.
The gravity of the Syrian problem is further to be seen in certain well-known
facts. The fact that the Arabic-speaking portion of the Turkish Empire has
been the birthplace of the three great religions: Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam, and that Palestine contains places sacred to all three, makes
inevitably a center of interest and concern for the whole civilized world.
No solution which is merely local or has only a single people in mind can
avail.
As a portion of the bridge-land uniting Europe, Asia, and Africa, too-where
in a peculiar degree the East and the West meet-Syria has a place of such
strategic importance, politically and commercially, and from the point of
view of world civilization, as also to make it imperative that the settlement
here brought about should be so just as to give promise of permanently good
results for the whole cause of the development of a righteous civilization
in the world. Every part of the former Turkish Empire must be given a new
life and opportunity under thoroughly changed political conditions.
The war and the consequent breaking up of the Turkish Empire, moreover,
give a great opportunity-not likely to return -to build now in Syria a Near
East State on the modern basis of full religious liberty, deliberately including
various religious faiths, and especially guarding rights of minorities.
It is a matter of justice to the Arabs, in the recognition of the Arab people
and their desire for national expression, and of deep and lasting concern
to the world, that an Arab state along modern political lines should be
formed. While the elements are very various, the interests often divisive,
and much of the population not yet fitted for self-government, the conditions
are nevertheless as favorable as could be reasonably expected under the
circumstances to make the trial now. The mixed and varied populations have
lived together with a fair degree of unity under Turkish domination, and
in spite of the divisive Turkish policy. They ought to do far better under
a state on modern lines and with an enlightened mandatary.
In any case, the oversight of a mandatory power, and of the League of
Nations, would prevent this attempt from taking such a course as that taken
by the Young Turk Movement. The Arabs, too, will know that this is their
best opportunity for the formation of an Arab State, and will be put on
their mettle to achieve a distinct success. The insight and breadth of sympathy
revealed by Emir Feisal make him peculiarly well fitted, also, for the headship
of a State involving both Oriental and Occidental elements. The trial at
least could safely be made under a sympathetic mandatary Power, and made
with good promise of success. If the experiment finally failed division
of territory could still follow. But to begin with division of territory
along religious lines is to invite increasing exclusiveness, misunderstanding,
and friction. As Dr. W. M. Ramsay has said concerning certain other portions
of the Turkish Empire:
"The attempt to sort our religions and settle them in different
localities is wrong and will prove fatal. The progress of history depends
upon diversity of population in each district." And there is real danger
in breaking Syria up into meaningless fragments.
Any policy adopted, therefore, for Syria should look to "the establishment
of a national government and administration deriving their authority from
the initiative and free choice of the native populations," and should
treat it as far as possible in harmony with its natural geographic and economic
unity. This is the natural course to be taken, if at all feasible. It is
directly in line with the expressed purpose of the Peace Conference.
And it is the plain object of the desires and ambitions of a large majority
of the population concerned.
It is interesting, also, to find that both British and French officers
in Syria seemed agreed in the belief that the unity of all Syria under one
mandatary was desirable; and that there were certain to be constant friction
and dangers to peace among British, French, and Arabs, if both British and
French remained in the country.
On the other hand, the practical obstacles to the unity of Syria are:
The apparent unwillingness of either the British or the French to withdraw
from Syria-the British from Palestine, or the French from Beirut and the
Lebanon; the intense opposition of the Arabs and the Christians to the Zionist
Program; the common Lebanese demand for complete separate independence;
the strong feeling of the Arabs of the East against any French control;
the fear on the part of many Christians of Moslem domination; and the lack
of as vigorous a Syrian national feeling as could be desired. These obstacles
will be discussed in the recommendations of the Commissioners.
In the light, now, of these practical obstacles to the unity of Syria,
of the general considerations favoring that unity, and of the wide range
of data secured by our survey, we turn to our recommendations.
III-RECOMMENDATIONS
The commissioners make to the Peace Conference the following recommendations
for the treatment of Syria:
We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our
Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or more
powers) is brought into Syria, should come in not at all as a colonizing
Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatary under the League
of Nations with the clear consciousness that "the well-being and development"
of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust."
(1 ) To this end the mandate should have limited term, the time of expiration
to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts
as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the Mandatary
to the League or in other ways.
(2) The Mandatary Administration should have, however, a period and power
sufficient to ensure the success of the new state, and especially to make
possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings,
essential to secure founding of the State.
(3) The Mandatary Administration should be characterized from the beginning
by a strong and vital educational emphasis, in clear recognition of the
imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state,
and for the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation
of national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which
has only recently come to self-consciousness.
(4) The Mandatary should definitely seek, from the beginning of its trusteeship,
to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as rapidly as
conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic state,
and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so
forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in
the progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group
of disciplined civil servants.
( 5 ) The period of "tutelage" should not be unduly prolonged,
but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it can safely
be done, remembering that the primary business of governments is not the
accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.
(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatary in a country like Syria,
and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is ensured.
both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a jealous
care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more vital
than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.
(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of indebtedness
on the part of the new state should be avoided, as well as any entanglements
financially with the affairs of the Mandatary Power. On the other hand the
legitimate established privileges of foreigners such as rights to maintain
schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject
to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations
in the interest of Syria. The Mandatary Power should not take advantage
of its position to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment
either of Syria or of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new
State as rapidly as possible to economic independence as well as to political
independence.
Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the Commission,
the fulfillment of at least the conditions now named should be assured,
if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the policy
of mandataries already embodied in "The Covenant of the League of Nations."
This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria, however
the machinery of administration is finally organized. The Damascus Congress
betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country would become,
though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other
Power. That fear must be completely allayed.
B. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria be preserved,
in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people
of-Syria
(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small
and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to
make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable,
if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab
in language, culture, traditions, and customs.
(2) This recommendation is in line with important "general considerations"
already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well
as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.
(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special
commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general
allotted. The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus
Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically
or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking
and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia
with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of
further seacoast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.
(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria, the natural
desires of regions like the Lebanon which have already had a measure of
independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly,
to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the case of
strongly unified groups. Even the "Damascus Program" which presses
so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad
decentralization principles."
Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy
within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate
aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary,
it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations
with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member
of the State, rather than entirely independent of it.
As a predominantly Christian country too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem
domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have
a fourfold safeguard; her own large autonomy: the presence of a strong mandatary
for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the
new State would be forming, the oversight of the League of Nations, with
its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; and
the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such
a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover,
there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians
were present in the state in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated
outside the state, as experience of the relations of different religious
faiths in India suggests.
As to predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon
would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if
she were within the Syrian state, feeling its problems and needs and sharing
all its life, instead of outside it absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns.
For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then,
the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful
Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be made for
Palestine; though, as "the Holy Land" for Jews and Christians
and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify
unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be
discussed more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning
Zionism.
C. We recommend, in the third place that Syria be placed under one Mandatary
Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.
( 1 ) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several
mandataries, even if existing national unity were recognized- or to attempt
a joint mandatary of the whole on the commission plan: -neither of these
courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote
the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people.
It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to
some such form of divided mandate, but it is not a solution to be voluntarily
chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as
considerations already urged indicate.
(2) It is not to be forgotten either, that, however they are handled
politically the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in
some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another-the Arabs of the
East and the people of the coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they
be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations,
by a single mandatary ? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem
of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent
fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians,
the relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and
inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates
the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern
social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding "the
other half," as it can be understood only by close and living relations.
Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single
mandatary ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity
of feeling throughout the state, and ought to steadily improve group relations.
The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted
that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various
groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish
Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain
that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike,
not their exploitation, decent human relations to be secured-a foundation
which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic
groups.
The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all
groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under-a single
mandate.
D. We recommend, in the fourth n place, that Emir Feisal be made head
of the new united Syrian State.
(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative
Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there seems to be
no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of Syria sincerely
desire to have Emir Feisal as ruler.
(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems naturally
adapted to the Arabs, with their, long training under tribal conditions,
and with their traditional respect for their chiefs. They seem to need;
more than most people, a king as the personal symbol of the power of the
State.
(3) Emir Feisal has come, too, naturally into his present place of power,
and there is no one else who could well replace him. He had the great advantage
of being the son of the Sherif of Mecca, and as such honored throughout
the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility
for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the complete deliverance
of the Arab-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He was consequently
hailed by the "Damascus Congress" as having "merited their
full confidence and entire reliance." He was taken up and supported
by the British as the most promising candidate for the headship of the new
Arab State-an Arab of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through
his Shefifian connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best
in the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly,
and his kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does
not make so strong an appeal to the Christians of the West Coast, as to
the Arabs of the East, but no man can be named who would have a stronger
general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skillful in dealing with men, winning
in manner, a man of sincerity, insight, and power. Whether he has the full
strength needed for his difficult task it is too early to say, but certainly
no other Arab leader combines so many elements of power as he, and he will
have invaluable help throughout the mandatary period.
The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact that an
Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state in
the Near East.
ZIONISM
E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme
Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking
finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.
(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed
in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force
of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians
have driven them to the recommendation here made.
(2) The commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist
program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much
concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something
of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations
and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of
many of the colonists and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming
natural obstacles.
(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been
given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement
in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the
strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to -favoring "the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,"
"it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
the civil and religious rights existing in non-Jewish communities in Palestine"-it
can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified.
For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent
to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a
Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."
The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish
representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete
dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various
forms of purchase.
In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following
principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated peoples
of the world were fighting"; "The settlement of every question,
whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political
relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by
the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material
interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different
settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."
If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population
are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to
be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine-nearly nine tenths
of the whole-are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables
show that there |