Defending Against the Allied Bombing Campaign: Air Raid Shelters
and Gas Protection in Germany, 1939-1945
Part 1
RECENTLY THE ARGUMENT has been advanced that each of the crematoria
at Birkenau was equipped with a gas-tight bomb shelter. The argument
was first made in the Summer of 1996 by Arthur R. Butz, with respect
to Crematoria II and III in his
Vergasungskeller
article. [1] In the Spring of 1997 the concept was extended to cover
all of the crematoria in Birkenau in my article
Technique and Operation of German Anti-Gas
Shelters in World War Two [hereinafter, Technique]. [2]
Although the identification of these spaces as gas-tight bomb shelters was
corroborated in Technique by extensive reference to contemporary
German civil defense literature, public acceptance of the thesis has
been slow. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that the "Bomb Shelter Thesis"
contradicts the work of Jean Claude Pressac and others, notably, Robert
Jan van Pelt. [3] In addition we must recognize that the thesis, in
either the Butz or Crowell variant, seems at first glance both unusual
and even extraordinary.
But the argument for bomb shelters in the Birkenau crematoria seems
extraordinary only because the scope of the German civil defense program
is so little known. Hence, when the crematoria are identified as having
had gas tight bomb shelters the first reaction of the skeptic will be,
why would there be alterations for the crematoria to serve as air raid
shelters? Why not other buildings? without recognizing that similar
shelters were quite common in Germany, and, we believe it possible to
show, also in the concentration camp system and Auschwitz-Birkenau in
particular. So it should be clear that the argument for gas-tight bomb
shelters in the Birkenau crematoria is strengthened to the extent that
analogous structures can be shown to have existed both in the concentration
camp system as well as in German cities.
The present article is an attempt to carry the argument for comparison
and corroboration forward, in this case by supplementing the contemporary
civil defense literature cited in Technique with secondary studies
of German civil defense in World War Two, comprising both recent German
studies as well as US government studies prepared in the immediate postwar
period. The result will be the broader realization, widely recognized
in the secondary literature, that gas tight bomb shelters were a common
feature on the wartime German civilian and concentration camp landscape.
We will begin by reviewing the rules and recommendations for German
civil defense, and will find that the precautions the Germans took for
bomb and gas attacks were extensive. A review of the actual types of
structures will show a wide array of constructions, including adaptations
of natural geologic formations, existing structures for secondary bomb
shelter use, covered trenches for concentration camp internees, and
a particular emphasis on above ground structures, all of which were
designed to defend against both bombs and gas attacks. Provisions for
gas-tight doors, including those that would lock from the outside, reinforced
concrete roofs, including those with brick ventilation shafts, and gas-filtering
ventilation systems will be shown to have been quite common, according
to both the documentary evidence and the oral testimony of the men,
women, and children who took part in the large civil defense network.
In addition, we will note the particular emphasis placed on chemical
decontamination facilities, which would usually be sited in only a few
dual-purpose locations in a city, and which, along with the specially
trained decontamination crews, would also be used to combat vermin and
the spread of infectious diseases, including typhus.
In the course of such a review we cannot pass by the opportunity to
describe some of the circumstances whereby the Germans used this civil
defense apparatus to maximum advantage, overcoming terror, destruction,
and massive casualties to survive and endure. For if the story of the
civil defense precautions in the concentration camp system is little
known, so too has the German people's battle for survival in the Allied
bombing campaign been largely ignored.
Part 1: Civil Defense in Germany
1.1 Regulations
It was generally accepted after World War One that aerial bombardment
would be a feature of any future war, and that civilian populations
would be targets. "Strategic" bombing in this sense was a kind of indirect
warfare, meant to rupture the enemy's economy or demoralize its population
so that the enemy army would be forced to capitulate. [4] Such indirect
warfare is a classic feature of siege warfare as well as naval blockade,
the last circumstance may explain why Great Britain became the leading
practitioner of strategic area bombing in World War Two. A famous expression
of Britain's point of view was made by Stanley Baldwin in the House
of Commons on November 10, 1932:
"I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that there
is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever
people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only
defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women
and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."
[H43f, S12]
Recognizing such a position, Germany made attempts to protect itself
passively from future air attack even in the 1920's, even though active
defense -- searchlights, flak guns, and so on -- were forbidden by the
Treaty of Versailles. [S11] Already in 1931 the Ministry of the Interior
was issuing guidelines for civil defense, and in 1932 the first issue
of the Vorläufige Ortsanweisung für den Luftschutz der Zivilbevölkerung
was issued, which, by war's end would comprise 12 chapters with numerous
comprehensive attachments. [S12]
After Hitler took power Germany began preparing mobilization plans,
and these included provision for the defense of cities. The mobilization
plans of the Luftwaffe included a special attachment breaking down the
cities of Germany into Civil Defense Areas (Luftschutzorten)
of Class I, II, and III. [S14] The difference in classes was primarily
a matter of local control, inspection, and preparedness. The controls
would be in the hands of the Luftschutzleiter (civil defense
leader) usually the mayor or sometimes the local Nazi gauleiter. The
104 cities in Class I (or LSO-I) included all cities with large
populations, and other cities that were considered vital for war industries.
Thus Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, and Dresden were naturally LSO-I:
but so was Siegen, with a population of 60,000. Siegen's inclusion was
based on its location near the Ruhr, its status as a garrison city,
and its war important industries.[S16]
It would be tedious to go over the voluminous regulations governing
the civil defense establishment in Germany from 1933 forwards, but there
are two documents that deserve special attention: The Code of Practice
for Building Shelters [Bestimmungen für den Bau von Luftschutz
Bunkern] and the orders pertaining to the Luftschutz Führer Sofort
Programm, that is, the Fuhrer's Emergency Air Raid Program,
usually referred to as the LS-Führerprogramm.
The United States, in its postwar surveys, stressed the detailed nature
of the Code and its provisions.[CD152f] In fact, the Code
also laid down basic guidelines in which civil defense had to be viewed.
The basic concepts turned on the collective nature of the enterprise:
any program was to cover the whole city, and the program had to be worked
into any urban development programs. The Code gave preference
to above ground shelters, because underground shelters were costlier.
In addition, it specified various details, such as the number of gas-locks
for entry (preferably, two), the width of entries, the size of the staircases,
the need for washrooms, first aid rooms, and so on. [CD153]
If the Code underlay Germany's civil defense approach, the
LS-Führerprogramm of November, 1940, stressed the same points
with greater detail and greater urgency. By the time of its issuance,
Germany was reconciled to a long air war, therefore the details of the
program were meant to be comprehensive and prescriptive, as a listing
of some of its provisions show:
1. For buildings (municipal buildings, dwellings, lots) in which
there are up to now none or inadequate air raid shelters, do it
yourself air raid measures will be adopted.
2. Existing or newly constructed streets or transportation paths
(e.g., subways and tunnels) are to be adapted for the construction
of underground and bombproof air raid shelters.
3. The openings to the outside in existing air raid shelters are
to be removed and at the same time connections are to be made [to
other shelters] with collapsible fire walls.
4. New public air raid shelters are to be constructed, and existing
air raid shelters are to be made, as bombproof as possible.
5. All new constructions, particularly in buildings for the armaments
industry, are henceforth to be equipped with bombproof air raid
shelters. Such shelters are to have the same priority as the structure
being built itself. [S23f, N327ff]
1. Für Wohngebiete (städtische Gebiete, Siedlungen,
Laubenkolonien), in denen bisher keine oder unzureichende Luftschutzräume
vohanden sind, sind behelfsmaßige Luftschutzmaßnahmen zu treffen.
2. Vorhandene oder neu zu bauende Verkehrsstraßen oder Verkehrsanlagen
(z.B. Untergrundbahnen und Tunnelbauten) sind für den Bau unterirdischer,
bombensicherer Luftschutzräume auszunutzen.
3. Die in Luftschutzräumen vorhandenen Öffnungen in den Außenwanden
des Gebäudes sind zu beseitigen unter gleichzeitiger beschleunigter
Durchführung der gesetzlich geordneten Brandmauerdurchbruche.
4. Neu zu errichtende öffentliche Luftschutzräume sind bombensicher
zu bauen, die vorhandenen öffentlichen Luftschutzräume sind -- soweit
möglich -- auf Bombensicherheit zu verstärken.
5. Bei allen Neubauten, insbesondere bei den Bauten der Rüstungsindustrie,
sind von vorneherein bomensichere Luftschutzräume auszuführen. Sie
sind in die gleiche Dringlichkeitsstufe wie die Bauvorhaben selbst
aufzunehmen.
A few clarifications to the program are necessary. The openings to
the outside that needed to be closed has to do with the demonstrated
insecurity for some emergency exits; this would lead eventually to the
filling in of emergency exit passages with sand, or boxes of gravel,
or even the filling in with a narrow wall. Second, the Brandmauerdurchbruch,
or collapsible fire wall, was meant to connect a series of buildings,
such as one would find in large cities. Such an expedient would of course
be useless in situations where a building was isolated. The most striking
thing about the LS-Führerprogramm, aside from the extensive construction
that followed after it was issued, is the fact that it was global: all
buildings, new or old, were to be equipped with bomb shelters.
1.2 Organization of Civil Defense in Cities
The organization for Civil Defense in Germany was extremely widespread.
The Reichsluftschutzbund (hereinafter, RLB) [5] numbered
12 million members by 1939 [B13], and it is only reasonable to assume
that its numbers swelled as the war continued. Each city had a complicated
hierarchy of positions and departments whose functions were clearly
marked out.
The basic structure was the Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst (SHD,
Recue and Repair Service), which was further subdivided. The Sicherheitsdienst
(S-Dienst) functioned as security and police in the event of
air raids, the Feuerlöschdienst (F-Dienst) were the firefighting
crews, the Instandsetsungsdienst (I-Dienst) were charged
with technical and emergency repairs, including bomb disposal and the
rescue of bombing victims, and the Sanitatdienst (San-Dienst)
worked closely with the Red Cross and the municipal health authorities
in handling all problems of health, emergency care, and hygiene that
grew out of the bombing raids. There was even a special department devoted
to veterinary care, with emergency stations for the care of draft animals
and pets. [N46-143]
The final division of the civil defense forces was the Entgiftungsdienst
or the Decontamination Service. The decontamination workers were
normally attached to the firefighters, and indeed in Nuremberg they
were amalgamated with the firefighters in 1940, so that the gas protection
function of the E-Dienst became auxiliary [N77]. Already by 1939,
Nuremberg, with a population of about 450,000, had 15 decontamination
squads with 15 NCOs and 300 men, in addition, there were 56 gas testers
(Gasspürer) attached to the central authority. [N48] The role
of the gas testers were to follow up on any suspicions of gas usage
and take samples to one of 25 gas testing labs. Other fixed sites related
to the work of the Decontamination Service included five decontamination
centers with 5 NCOs and 20 men, and five centers for the decontamination
of materials (Sachenentgiftungsanstalten) also divided among
25 personnel. The location of these stations is difficult to establish
today but it is clear that they made use of existing locations that
featured laundries and public bathing facilities [N78, CD164]. It seems
probable also that the municipal disinfection center (several German
cities possessed these) was earmarked for dual purpose [6]. The example
in the city of Nuremberg can safely be extrapolated to Germany at large,
not least because of the global nature of the US Strategic Bombing Survey's
report which covers German gas protection measures in detail.[CD164f].
The members of the Decontamination Service throughout Germany were
issued special protective clothing, including rubberized suits and boots,
and, like other important personnel in the Civil Defense Program, had
higher quality gas masks (some 12 million gas masks in all were distributed).
[CD153,CD164] The US Strategic Survey Final Report considered it significant
that the production of this anti-gas warfare gear continued until the
end of the war.[CD164] In addition, the members of the decontamination
squads received special training: of the 150 hours of instruction for
these auxiliary firefighters, no less than 25 1/2 hours were devoted
to chemical warfare.[N78] On the other hand, in order to reduce anxiety,
the average citizen received only about a half hour of chemical warfare
instruction. [CD165]
In addition to the decontamination squads, gas testers, the various
fixed sites and their work crews, gas protection also included trucks
and even ships equipped with cleansing apparatus, and chemicals and
decontamination equipment, including trucks and supplies held in reserve
to be sent to afflicted areas.[CD164f]
As to the application of gas protection features to air raid shelters,
it was a given that bombproof also meant gasproof, as one author remarks:
"Particular attention had to be given to the entrances to the bunkers.
Each bunker had to have at least two entrances and each entrance had
to be equipped with a gaslock. It was understood that bombproof meant
proof against gas bombs!" [S40] and the US Strategic Bombing Survey
stated "All buildings and public shelters constructed or modified to
house air-raid protection activities were gas proof." [CD164] Further
evidence of the pervasive nature of gas protection in Germany can be
found in Technique.
1.3 Types of Shelters and Equipment
Secondary sources pertaining to the civil defense procedures of individual
cities are a good source of information on the types of shelters erected.
But an extremely useful summary of such structures can also be found
in an essentially contemporary publication of the US government, the
Civil Defense Division Final Report, issued in its second edition
in January, 1947.
The most basic shelter was the home shelter, or do it yourself shelter
(Behelfmässige Luftschutzraum) such as one would find in private
homes or apartment buildings. Since some 22 million Germans lived in
58 cities of 100,000 or more [H128], and there were 104 cities with
priority civil defense classification (i.e., Luftschutzort I)
[S15], we can imagine that there must have been literally hundreds of
thousands of cellars that were fitted out with at least minimal bomb
and gas protection. Here, the numerous "how-to" articles in periodicals
such as Gasschutz und Luftschutz indicate the extent of the preparation.
According the the US Strategic Bombing Survey, such shelters were subject
to inspection and approval by the local authorities [CD155] and had
to meet the following specifications: (1) at least rudimentary gas-proofing,
(2) at least one emergency exit (usually to an adjoining cellar through
a Brandmauerdurchbruch, or collapsible fire wall), (3) the sealing
of all other openings to the outside, and (4) in some cases rudimentary
struts of wooden beams or brick. [CD155] The costs for such private
shelters was frequently subsidized by the government [CD155] : a wise
move, since during the heavy raids the line between private and public
shelters was frequently erased. As can be imagined such basic basement
shelters provided only marginal support in the heaviest raids, but the
insistence on gas proofing is certainly significant in evaluating the
importance and pervasiveness of anti-gas measures.
Graphic 1-3: Plans for a basement bomb shelter
A secondary category involved semi-public shelters which included schools
and other municipal buildings. These were probably the most numerous
of the various dual purpose shelters that served a public function;
the US Strategic Bombing Survey specifies that they were equipped with
gas-tight steel doors.[CD156] The problem with such converted shelters
is that in some parts of the country, notably in the East and South,
the building of communal shelters was delayed until late in the war,
precisely at the point when building materials were most difficult to
obtain. For example, Bavaria was long called the "Air Raid Shelter of
Germany" on the understanding that it would not be bombed because of
its distance from Britain. This assumption also led to the "Kinder
Land Verschickung" a program in which children were evacuated from
the North and West to the South. [US214] But from 1943 onwards all parts
of the country would be bombed, and this probably explains the variability
in the children's death toll, ranging from 10% in places like Hamburg
and Nuremberg to 30% in cities like Darmstadt (see discussion below)
because the children in the latter locations would not have been evacuated.
Acceptable bomb and gas protection seem to have been widely available
in converted shelters, as we shall see, but given the nature of the
firestorm raids from 1943 onwards these would be of little help; cities
like Munich, Augburg, and Dresden, were seriously affected by a lack
of preparedness.
Of the dedicated public shelters, there were several types. Probably
the most numerous of these were the trench shelters, such as one would
find in the labor camps and concentration camps, these will be discussed
in more detail later. Stollen were also found, and were essentially
semicircular tunnels bored into a hillside, although often downtown
underground bunkers would mimic the structure of Stollen. Since
the vertical protection would depend on the height of the hill being
bored into, we can imagine that they were quite secure, the main problem
with such shelters could only be built where the lay of the land would
support them. And there were occasional design lapses: one Stollen
in Stuttgart, designed to hold 1,000, was notorious for lacking any
restrooms. [S99]
Another common shelter, particularly in the cities, were large Luftschutzbunkern.
Sometimes these involved the expansion of existing basements, or the
digging of sub-basements. The floor plans for some of these shelters
are mind-boggling in size, one that was inspected could hold 10,000
people. [CD157] Although priority was given to above ground shelters,
the Germans ended up building many underground because of the lack of
space, particularly in the centers of cities. [CD157] These were usually
long, flat structures with flat roofs of reinforced concrete. Forced
ventilation was standard, with standard Schutzraumbelüfter which
were operated by electricity or by hand. Air intakes (Entlüftungsrohren)
would usually be equipped with a gas-tight flap, as drawings indicate,
[S77] sometimes the air intake would have a large and heavily sloped
brick chimney, which, due to the slope, would occupy a mass many times
greater than the aperture. [N569] It was apparently not unusual to use
vent pipes for camouflage purposes. [CD162]
Graphic 1-4: A Hochbunker, or above ground bomb shelter
The large Hochbunker or above ground bunker was a German innovation
that had no counterpart among the Allies. They were usually large concrete
blocks built above ground and designed, like the Luftschutz bunkern,
for multiple use: for people, important documents, artworks. Eventual
peace-time use was envisioned for the Hochbunkern: indeed, in
Hamburg many of these would be converted to office blocks after the
war. [G69] They could be classed in various categories, including those
that were provided with false roofs and painted-on windows that looked
like gigantic chateaux, others that resembled squat skyscrapers with
bricked in windows, still others that were round and faced with brick
like the keep of a castle, and still others that looked like tapered
towers. [S26ff, CD157f]
Graphic 1-5: Bomb shelter design, perhaps an attempt at disguising
the purpose.
Although above ground shelters would seem particularly vulnerable because
they were exposed, in practice they seem to have worked quite well.
Since they were of concrete, they were not set ablaze, and since they
were detached from other buildings they were not as directly affected
by other burning buildings; hence the effects of heat or gases would
not be as great. In the Hamburg raids of late July 1943, the second
to last of which created the famous firestorm, only 100 people in above
ground shelters perished, largely as a result of two direct hits on
smaller structures. Considering that more than 50,000 people were killed
that night and that over eleven hundred tons of high explosives were
expended that seems a remarkably low total.
Perhaps one of the most unusual public air raid shelters was the
Parkhöhle in Weimar. The Parkhöhle is a long jagged series
of caves that underlay the city, several hundred meters in length, caused
by water cutting through the rock formations. Long a tourist attraction,
the Parkhöhle was converted to bomb shelter use late in the war,
with some brick strutting done, as well as the provision of some other
equipment. Because of its size, it was not felt necessary to ventilate
its long corridors. The caves were also the site of extensive archaeological
work by Johann Wolfgang Goethe and his son: the ethnographic museums
of Weimar today still display their finds of ancient bones and other
materials from the Old Stone Age. [P19ff,49]
As the discussion in Technique has already noted, ventilation
in the air raid shelters was a problem insofar as it had to provide
sufficient air per person (11 cubic feet per minute), had to provide
temperatures in the acceptable range (24 C to 17C), and provide for
humidity control. [CD158] In addition, the more secure shelters would
be flooded with refugees in the event of severe raids. Overcrowding
was always a problem.
It is difficult to reconstruct the number of shelters or the types
of shelters built before and during the war, but various indications
from the secondary literature provides a number of clues. It is known,
for example, that Hamburg had over 2,000 public shelters for about 500,000
persons out of a population of over 1 million. [G69] Wuppertal, with
a population of 400,000, built or converted over 100 shelters. [S98]
Since Hamburg was one of the better prepared cities in the Reich, it
is a safe inference that the rest of the residents were distributed
in smaller home shelters and LS-Kellern, the colloquial name
for the cellars of apartment buildings adapted for bomb shelter use.
[N442] Dresden, on the other hand, had no dedicated public shelters,
and only a few converted public shelters, yet home and apartment protection
appears to have been up to standard. [D166f]
A detailed study of the city of Siegen provides information that we
could extrapolate to the rest of the Reich. Under the LS-Führerprogramm,
over 10 million RM was spent in the construction of 17 large public
shelters, another 6 million for 8 Stollen, and close to another
million in the conversion of 100 or so existing buildings to semi-public
shelters. For a total outlay of over 17 million Reichsmarks, Siegen
was able to provide adequate public shelter for about 20% of its population
of 60,000, the rest falling back on home and cellar shelters. [S86]
There is also the case of Nuremberg. Early in the course of the
LS-Führerprogramm, four shelters were designed for a cost of 3.6
million RM, even though the city began the war with dozens of public
shelters. [N385] In 1943, the budget called for 52 new public shelters,
the improvement of 294 old shelters, and the strutting and splinterproofing
of of 3,600 home shelters for a cost of one and a half million RM.[N450]
But neither in Nuremberg, nor in any other city, was funding, principally
by the government, ever lacking -- "Geld war genug da" -- the
money was always there. [N385] Further data on Nuremberg indicates that
in 1942 there were 13,500 Kelleräume, that is, shelters for home
and apartment dwellers. [N446]
Graphic 1-6: A bunker for the storage of artworks in Nuremberg
Considering that there were over 12 million in the Luftschutzbund
in 1939, that over 22 million Germans lived in 58 cities highly vulnerable
to air attack (over 75 cities were essentially leveled by the RAF alone)
[H374f] we can easily arrive at the conclusion that the program built
thousands of dedicated public shelters, tens of thousands of semi-public
conversions, and hundreds of thousands of home and cellar shelters at
a total cost of billions of Marks.
1.4 German Civil Defense in Practice
The test for the German civil defense system came when the bombs started
to fall. In spite of the careful planning, many precautions would not
function in firestorm conditions. Then survival became a matter of luck,
desperate courage, or strong leadership among the RLB Feldwebeln
(sergeant majors), and fire wardens.
Under normal conditions the system seemed to operate well enough, with
the usual precautions functioning normally. Thus one man would recall
his boyhood experiences:
"I was a Hitler Youth messenger. As such, I was stationed at an
air raid shelter bunker built both above ground and underground.
When an air raid alarm sounded, we had to be there on time and open
the bunker with the "block leader", a party official who was responsible
for the street. We had to care for the children, give them milk,
and so on, if the alarm lasted a long time. [...] The block leader
or the women from the Nazi's women's organization sent around and
handed out toys to the children and light sedatives to the adults.
And the louder the attack got outside, the quieter it got in the
bunker.
"The underground shelters were more like "tube bunkers." When you came through
the steel door, fitted with rubber around the edges to make it airtight,
you entered a diagonal hallway. This hallway was joined by three
or four tube-like hallways perpendicular to it. Each of these, in
turn, was a separate bunker. Air was pumped through each tube by
machines which we Hitler Youth operated. That was one of our jobs.
My duties also involved running messages from one bunker to another
if the telephones went dead. We were outfitted with gas masks, steel
helmets, etc. We had to go out at all times, even when the bombs
were falling. I was 13 years old at the time." [V211]
Graphic 1-6: A messenger boy in Hamburg who didn't make it through
the firestorm. Very little remains of his body except a partial skeleton.
The above not only indicates the ordinariness of underground shelters,
gas tight steel doors, and hand-cranked ventilators but also the integral
role that women and children played in civil defense. One woman, in
Dresden, describes surviving the American daylight raid after the famous
firestorm:
"Normally, there were only 20 to 25 of us down in the cellar. But
now, with many people off the street, including those who'd stopped
over at our house, there were about 100 of us. Nevertheless, no
on panicked -- we were too numb and demoralized from the night before.
We just sat there. The attack rolled closer, and then a bomb hit.
It was like a bowling ball that bounced, or jumped perhaps, and
at that moment the lights went out. The whole basement filled with
dust. When the bomb carpet reached us, I crouched in a squatting
position, my head between my legs. The air pressure was immense,
but only for a moment. The rubber seals on the windows and the steel
doors probably helped to absorb some of the impact. Someone screamed,
and then it was quiet. Then a voice shouted, 'It's all right, nothing's
happened.' It was the shelter warden." [V231]
The above quote is informative in a couple of ways. It describes the typical
gas tight seals on steel doors and windows. Such fixtures appear to
have been common, even in Dresden, where virtually no large public shelters
were especially built. [S99f,D166f] In addition, the role of the shelter
warden in maintaining calm in the shelters is suggested. Indeed, it
appears in several cases that the survival of thousands if not tens
of thousands depended on the leadership and resource of the Feldwebeln
(Sergeant Majors) Branddirektors (Fire Wardens) and the roving
rescue squads of the SHD. The experiences of Sergeant Major Schäfer
and Fire Warden Bey of the Hamburg RLB, as related to Gordon
Musgrove for his Operation Gomorrah, are both typical and extraordinary.
[G71f,73f,91f]
Graphic 1-7: A gas tight door for an air-raid shelter at Nuremberg
Schäfer was bombed out of his own apartment the day before the firestorm
and had moved down the street to take up residence. When the firestorm
raid began, he withdrew to the shelter of his new building, along with
about 400 others. Over the course of the next half hour or so, he was
led to make several trips out of the shelter into the flames, in order
to determine the extent of the damage, from which he determined very
early on the need for immediate evacuation. And here we encounter a
common theme in shelter rescues: the need for forceful and even brutal
leadership to save lives.
In Schäfer's case, his shouted demand for evacuation was greeted with
fear and apathy; a reaction often cited in the air war literature. Schäfer's
response was immediate: he grabbed the first two people near the exit
by the scruff of their necks, dragged them up and out into the flaming
street, and took them down to the corner to point out the way to safety
in a nearby park. He repeated this exercise several more times, leading
out by force a number of women and their children, which in turn brought
everyone else out. When everyone had exited the shelter, he followed
behind. On the way, he broke into a building that was not yet in flames,
rescuing another party there, then made several dashes into the street
to save women whose clothing had caught fire, passed out and was revived
by some his people, retreated to the park with them, found temporary
relief from a water tower, and finally, after several hours, was rescued
with his full complement several blocks further away. There seems little
doubt that without Schäfer's energetic leadership his party would not
have survived, for the building from which they escaped collapsed minutes
after his departure. What makes his self-control and presence of mind
even more remarkable is that the last person to leave his shelter was
his wife, and and as she did so she handed him their three month old
child.
At this point it is necessary to pause and understand why there would
be so much reluctance to leave the shelters. Most of the city raids
were fire-raisers and several culminated in firestorms. Outside one
had to contend with exploding bombs (including delayed action bombs),
bomb splinters, falling masonry or entire buildings, and wooden roofing
and construction beams that would fly around in the storm winds like
matchsticks. In addition, all commentators make reference to a kind
of continual shower of sparks, using metaphors like "swarms of fiery
bumblebees", or "blizzards of red snow": these sparks could not only
burn and blind but could also set one's clothes on fire. Finally, there
was the heat, the gusting winds that would whipsaw back and forth and
create clouds of sparks and debris at intersections, and which would
reduce many trying to escape to crawling on all fours. Under these circumstances
the difficulty in breathing was terrible, oftentimes one finds the comment
"the air just wouldn't come" and similar sentiments. [US22] One warden,
standing outside his shelter, was seized with a terrifying premonition
of his own death, and not long after, suddenly passed out. Mercifully,
he was right outside of a Hochbunker, and was dragged back in
to safety. [G98] Another survivor describes falling to the ground and
being forced to breathe off the pavement during the firestorm, burning
his lips and mouth in the process. After an hour and a half the crisis
had passed. Dead people were laying all around him. [G111f] In the Dresden
raid, a survivor described a group of young girls who finally took the
risk to dash across a courtyard and open a gate that would allow them
to escape from the fires. Yet, as they were struggling with the gate,
a building nearby collapsed, killing all of them. [D170] Seeing or hearing
of such situations no doubt led many, and particularly women, women
with children, and the elderly, to forsake the frightening uncertainty
outside for what they believed would be the comparative security of
the bunker. And these people rarely survived.
The leadership and professionalism of the air raid crews were of particular
importance during firestorms, for here the elaborate systems of precaution
frequently broke down. Collective protector ventilation systems might
start bellowing smoke; emergency exits and shutters might crash in from
the impact of bombs and offer no more protection; fire walls might be
broken down in an effort to escape only to bring in lethal fire and
smoke. Here again the human element made the difference between life
and death.
Fire Warden Bey was another air raid leader in Hamburg. When the firestorm
raid on Hamburg began, he was walking around the block, gathering up
stragglers, but he too was soon forced to retreat to his shelter. Within
a matter of minutes the street was ablaze and the shelter was becoming
overcrowded with people from outside or from other shelters that had
failed, some of whose clothes were already smoldering, others who had
ripped them off to avoid the flames. The ventilation system soon broke
down and the lighting soon failed; and, while he had no real hopes of
fixing it, Bey made a shrewd display of instructing a few men to work
on it, hoping that that would placate his anxious crowd and give them
hope. Meanwhile, Bey and one of his NCO's went out on a number of patrols
looking for help or safety. No clear escape route was found, nor did
they find any emergency squads, who were roaming the blazing city in
trucks, but they did find some water which they carried back to the
bunker, which by now was extremely overcrowded. A series of cracks made
in the connecting walls with other cellars did not lead to safety either,
but brought even more dazed survivors into the shelter.
Going out into the street one more time, Bey finally flagged down a
Major of the SHD with a rescue party and organized an evacuation.
Returning to his shelter, Bey found that his people had given up all
hope, but finally he was able to coax a few to follow him out so that
he could explain the plan. No sooner had he stepped onto the street
to encourage the others to join him, when two adjoining buildings collapsed,
knocking him down and covering him with dust and debris. Meanwhile,
his observers panicked and dashed back to safety. Bey got to his feet
and returned to the shelter, and finally succeeded in goading and hectoring
his people into the street. One by one the people from the shelter stepped
out, encouraged by an exhausted Bey, forming a human chain down two
streets and into a park. After inspecting the shelter one last time,
he followed behind where he found all of his people in safety. Clearly
the tenacity and perseverance of Fire Warden Bey was instrumental in
their survival, but so too were the roving squads of the SHD,
who abandoned their role of fire monitoring and fire fighting early
on in order to save as many lives as possible. In this particular case,
the lives of more than 700 were spared.
A particularly harrowing example of rescue concerns the city of Brunswick,
which was bombed on October 15, 1944. Here the breakdown concerned what
in retrospect would seem both foolish and tragic: the tendency of some
shelter doors to be locked and bolted from the outside to prevent panicked
civilians from rushing outside prematurely. The raid began at 2:30 in
the morning and had developed a minor firestorm in the city center within
45 minutes. But this same area contained eight large bunkers and public
shelters which housed 23,000 people. It was impossible to get through
because of the firestorm, thus the rescue of these people depended solely
on the ingenuity of the firefighters.
By 5 AM they were ready. Hoses were leapfrogged forward group by group,
throwing up a "water alley" of protection for the next group that would
detach its hoses, move forward, reattach, and create the next segment
of the alley. Overcoming numerous complexities and failures, the firefighters
finally got through to the bunkers at 7 o'clock the next morning, and
"As the doors were unbarred and unlocked the rescuers heard the sound
of 'many people talking quietly but nervously under their breath.'"[D64f]
Then the survivors were led back to safety in an enormous human chain
under the canopy of water.
There is a tendency when discussing war to expect the greatest demonstrations
of leadership on the battlefield, and to view civilian victims as mere
passive statistics, whose numbers are then manipulated for political
purposes. Yet the narratives that have been recounted here remind us
otherwise. The leadership, courage, and devotion to duty demonstrated
by Sergeant Major Schäfer, Fire Warden Bey, and the Brunswick firefighters
-- along with many others -- were in the finest traditions of any military
organization. They were charged with saving as many lives as possible.
At great personal risk, they accomplished that mission.
1.5 The Total Number of Victims
Yet it must be said that hundreds of thousands died. A usual figure
for dead German civilians in the air war is about 593,000 -- most round
up to 600,000, others tend to argue for a lower figure, 300,000 to 400,000.
[H11,DD171n] Rudolf Höß, the commandant of Auschwitz, insisted in his
memoirs that "the total number of victims of the air war will probably
never be found. In my estimation there were probably several million.
The casualty figures were never made public. They were top secret."
[DD171] But the value of Höß' estimation is only a problem for those
who consider him reliable in other areas.
Graphic 1-8: Some of the tens of thousands of victims at Hamburg
The 593,000-600,000 figure, in turn, accepts a low estimate for Dresden,
about 35,000. But it is doubtful that the figures for Dresden were so
low. Hamburg, with a population of 1.2 million, suffered about 50,000
in the firestorm of July 29, 1943. But this was during the third of
several attacks, and we should expect that many had fled from the city
by the time of the third attack (the overall reduction in Hamburg's
population was 43%). [G162] We know that the population of several cities
was reduced as a result of air raids: Nuremberg, with a population of
about a half million, had been halved by late in the war. [N445] In
addition, Hamburg suffered its terrific casualties even though it was
well equipped with thousands of shelters.
On the other hand, Dresden, with a pre-war population of 600,000, had
been swelled with hundreds of thousands of refugees from the East, fleeing
the Soviet army: its population at the time of the raid was probably
comparable to Hamburg's at that city's zenith. Dresden was also struck
by a firestorm: but it lacked almost all of the safeguards present in
Hamburg. There were no large Hochbunkern in Dresden where people
could wait out the storm. Death from asphyxiation would seem to be guaranteed.
Additionally, the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city would
have no way of orienting themselves or knowing how to escape: we can
assume panic among many of them, and desperate retreat into overcrowded
underground converted public shelters that would ultimately become death
traps. Moreover, since Dresden had never before been seriously bombed,
the population had neither fled, nor reduced in number, nor were they
likely well versed in procedures that would save their lives: and only
one, evacuation, would save them in the firestorm. On top of this, the
second wave of British bombers was designed to bomb the center of the
city at precisely the time when the maximum amount of aid would be in
the streets trying to save the lives of the victims from the first wave:
that percentage of losses must also be considered. Finally, the third
blow by the Americans, next day, doubtless brought its casualties, along
with the P-51 Mustangs who in several well documented instances strafed
survivors, including Allied POW's, and clearly marked hospital wings.
[D182,SF180]
Graphic 1-9: The arrows point to shelter areas.
Finally, there is the matter of accurate counting due to the problems
of cleaning up the destruction. It is well known that tens of thousands
were burned on pyres in the center city, but bodies were still being
recovered when the Soviets took over the city on May 8, 1945. And, as
in the case of other cities, the recovery of dead bodies was not the
highest priority: bodies were recovered when possible, and there were
several cases after the war when the bulldozing of previously impassable
remains turned up human remnants. [G167] Hans Voigt of Bielefeld, whose
diary was employed by David Irving in his famous study of the Dresden
raid, described his job in the gathering, identification, and disposal
of remains: his final estimate was 135,000. [D208ff] While Hamburg is
usually conceded to have caused 50,000 deaths, it is well to keep in
mind that at the time the death toll was given out as between 30,000-40,000
[G167]: therefore, for people to assume similar casualties at Dresden
would have seemed normal at the time. However, the conditions were definitely
much worse in Dresden, for the reasons given, and therefore it seems
likely that the casualty figures were much higher than Hamburg. In that
case, Hans Voigt's projection seems reasonable, which would mean that
the overall loss of life in the air war was in the neighborhood of 700,000.
Of the 15,802 bodies that were identifiable after the Hamburg firestorm,
6,072 were men, 7,995 were women, and 1,735 were children (children
usually meaning pre-teenage). The percentages are thus 38.4% men, 50.6%
women, and 11% children. [G167] For Darmstadt, which also experienced
a firestorm but which was not as well prepared as Hamburg, there were
936 military deaths, 368 POW deaths, and 492 foreign laborer (i.e.,
forced laborer) deaths. Of 6,637 identifiable civilian dead (twice that
many died) 1,766 were men, 2,742 were women, and 2,129 children. The
percentages are thus 26.6% men, 41.3% women, 32% children. [H325f] Other
raids show similar breakdowns, from which we conclude that the Allied
campaign directed at German civilian morale killed mostly women and
children.
There is a melancholy footnote to the Dresden raid, which, whatever
its final counting, was surely the worst air raid in the European theater.
As is well known, Churchill proceeded with the raid because he wished
to make a demonstration of British might on the continent to the Soviets.
[D148,D214] In the event, however, the raid, which was promised to hold
up communications and transport for the front, and thus abet the Soviet
offensive, was a failure: within three days, the marshalling yards were
back to limited operation, and the city was not taken until after the
war was over. [D177f] It is interesting to note that Churchill, in his
memoirs, describes his determined effort to ensure that Eisenhower not
capture the city. [D232] One can suggest a number of reasons for this,
certainly the Americans crossed the Elbe at several other points. Popular
perceptions of Dresden continue to be informed by Kurt Vonnegut's
Slaughterhouse Five, a tremendously popular and widely read novel
that describes the raid as "the greatest massacre in European history."
[SF101]. In opposition, we have the occasional little-read book which
assures us that the bombing of Dresden was not a crime. As Vonnegut
would say, so it goes.
1.6 After the Raids: The Nature of Victim Injuries
The morning after the raids was the time for cleanup and rescue, although
even before the raids were over the people would be out in the street;
women putting out fires, boys working water pumps for the firefighters,
members of various crews and civilians organizing ad hoc rescue
operations. The first priority was locating and rescuing survivors,
as well as treating the injured, who, as in a real battle, would far
outnumber the dead. Doctors had been privately informed that the threat
of carbon monoxide poisoning was high, even in open areas, therefore
they were told to give priority to unconscious victims ahead of those
who had only been buried, burned, or with broken bones. [US24f] And
needless to say as in regular battle the number of injuries would far
exceed the dead; in Hamburg alone 37,439 were injured seriously enough
to be counted, including many amputees and those with severe and lifelong
burns. [G167]
Graphic 1-10: Listening for signs of life under the rubble
Locating the living had its problems because if they were in shelters
their location might have been covered by tons of brick and masonry.
To help orient the crews, underground cellars were supposed to have
white paint markings several meters up the side of the building pointing
down to the air raid shelter. [N495,N540] The I-Dienst was equipped
with listening equipment, which consisted of a console from which highly
sensitive microphones were led and then placed in piles of rubble. A
photograph from the period shows two members of a rescue crew, one gesturing
for silence, as they listen intently for the sound of breathing. [N538,N79-105]
Everyone was involved in rescues, including the forced laborers and
POW's who would be trucked in or marched in from local camps. Naturally,
the prisoners and laborers did not have much choice, but it appears
that in the immediate aftermath of a raid the political hatreds that
had inspired it were forgotten and the common denominator of humanity
took over. Irving relates how British POW's threw themselves into rescue
work after Dresden, improvising listening devices, running pipes down
into the debris to provide air to those below, putting themselves at
risk to save lives. [D183,D194] It was probably the same after all of
the raids.
Graphic 1-11: A sample page from a record of the dead at Nuremberg.
The center of the bombing zone was usually marked off, and the people
were forbidden access, as Vonnegut described it, "Germans were stopped
there. They were not permitted to explore the moon." [SF213] Then the
work crews, supplemented by POW's and camp internees, would turn to
the grisly task of recovering the dead. After the Kassel firestorm of
1943, the Police President issued suggestions on the things that would
be required by the rescue crews, including protective suits, rubber
gloves, goggles, disinfectants, and also tobacco (probably to defeat
the sense of smell), alcohol (to encourage the workers), shears and
bolt cutters to cut off the fingers of the dead wearing jewelry, and
which would later be used to identify the victims.[H320] Buckets of
rings were recovered from the Dresden dead in this fashion. [D208] In
Dresden, the devastation had been so great that there were no rubber
gloves available; an American POW describes how they improvised:
"The guard pointed at the corpse as one I should remove. He indicated
I take a belt off another body and put it around the one I was to
remove. It's surprising how much could be communicated by hand motions.
I put a belt around the neck of this man and started to drag it
towards the ramp, but [the body] broke in half. That was too much
for me. I sort of lost it for a bit. I began to scream, yell and
dance around. I tried to go out but they wouldn't let me. They got
me quieted down, pointed to one of the bottles on the table and
insisted I have a few swallows. That was the first I ever tasted
liquor of any kind." [A408]
Graphic 1-12: A young victim of the Hamburg firestorm
While It was understood that the decontamination squads would work
as firefighters until needed for special purposes, it should be obvious
that their protective clothing, equipment, and training made them perfectly
suited for activities including corpse handling, as well as in the disinfection
of shelters, where for example "corpse water" (Leichenwasser)
was found. [N77]
Graphic 1-13: A group of Nuremberg firefighters and decontamination
workers
At that point the decontamination squads would be subordinated to the
Sanitation Service (about 1/3 of the Nuremberg decontamination personnel
were so assigned)[N135], whose duties involved not only medical care
but also water purification, corpse handling, garbage disposal, pest
control, and disease control. [N77f,N123f,N298ff] In fact in Nuremberg,
in the last years of the war, the municipal disinfection center was
used not only for the combatting of rats and flies but also for the
delousing of city residents. [N123f]
The reward for these levels of sanitation prophylaxis was that German
cities were untouched by epidemics throughout the war, despite the intensive
destruction. One doctor, writing for the US Strategic Air Survey after
was war, was "incredulous" at this fact, which he initially considered
"inconceivable." [US82] His explanation focused on three factors: first,
the German people had high standards of personal cleanliness and orderliness
even under the most extreme conditions, the RLB agressively pursued
a program of education on personal hygiene, for which citizens were
required to attend six lectures each quarter throughout the war, and
finally the cooperation (Dr. Enloe calls it "docility") [US82] of the
population in such measures as boiling water after an air raid or in
laying out traps during designated rat extermination campaign.
Nevertheless, there were some outbreaks of disease, including typhus
fever, which did not appear until after "foreign laborers" had been
imported from Eastern Europe where the disease was endemic (it is assumed
that these foreign laborers constituted Soviet POWs and Eastern Jews).[US30]
Although the foreign workers and POW's were inspected, and one assumes,
deloused, twice on entering Germany, [US30f, cf. SF86] Dr. Bauer believed
that the conditions of the labor camps contributed to the outbreaks,
where overcrowding and lack of sanitation helped foster the disease,
plus the air raids which led the civilian population to freely mix with
the internees insofar as public shelters were used by both and because
evacuations usually involved both. He also cited the extension of working
hours and the lack of soap as contributing factors. Another likely influence
was the fact that the firefighting crews frequently wound up using raw
sewage in combating fires. [US63]
That the gas decontamination squads would become involved in such activities
corpse handing, disinfection, vermin control, and delousing creates
a number of powerful associations that point to multi-pupose roles in
situations where facilities or personnel are scarce. To put it another
way, the decontamination paradigm of treatment, featuring undressing,
washing, and dressing in clean garments, is also the model for the handling
of infectious material including the disposal of the dead, as well as
for the municipal disinfection stations, and the delousing stations
in concentration camps.
Most descriptions of the cleanup procedures contain not only wrenching
but also fantastic descriptions, particularly when dealing with the
recovery of the dead. Thus one reads of an "undulating layer of of gray
ash" that are supposed to represent firestorm victims [D45], or reductions
of people to puddles, or multi colored corpses, and so on. But unlike
other fantastic descriptions that have emerged from the war, such descriptions
have a strong documentary, forensic, and even photographic basis. After
the war the United States published studies that were based on the extensive
reports prepared by German doctors for the secret use of the German
government, and these explain the reality of these fantastic descriptions.[US,
14, 16, bibliography p. 29]
Graphic 1-14: Victims in Hamburg
The discoloration of corpses is one feature that even historians do
not seem to clearly understand. Thus, David Irving, who describes corpses
that are blue, orange, and green seems to think that carbon monoxide
poisoning was somehow responsible [D48], while Max Hastings, who even
cites the color purple, seems to think that the discoloration was due
to pyrotechnics. [H319,H315] In short, the descriptions are not understood,
so the authors have simply projected explanations onto the situation.
And this is human nature: confronted with sights and sounds that we
do not understand, we project onto the reality an explanation that accords
either with what we have been taught, or what we expect, or simple guesswork.
Corpse discoloration also accounted for similar projections by the
German people during the course of the war. A particular case concerns
the city of Kassel after the raid of October 22, 1943. This raid, which
raised a firestorm, killed less than 8,000 out of a population of 228,000,
and it appears that the extensive precautions of the RLB were
a major factor [D46ff]. But when many of the dead were found in their
shelters days after the attack, the brilliant hues their bodies had
assumed brought forth the charge of poison gas usage. To stabilize the
situation, doctors conducted extensive postmortems; part of their report,
dated November 1, 1943, reads as follows:
"Five of the corpses selected by the chief Police-doctor in Kassel,
Herr Senior Staff Police-doctor Fehmel, were dissected at the cemetery.
The corpses concerned, of people killed during the terror-raid on
Kassel on 22.10.43, had been recovered from basements after several
days. Closer particulars are not known. Two corpses were of the
male sex and about 18-20 years old; three were of women, of which
one was between about 50 and 60 years old, the other two about 30
years old. "There were no external injuries manifest
on the corpses, which were in a condition of high-degree putrefaction.
[...] The skin was partly colored a uniform red as a result of the
hemolysis which had set in, but in extensive areas it was already
colored green. This green coloring is attributed to the action of
the ammonium sulphide with the reduced hemoglobin, which had, of
course, permeated the skin as a result of the hemolysis that had
preceded it. This green coloration, the analysis of which had
been specially stressed in the conferences in Kassel, is as such
purely a post mortem manifestation of corpses, cannot be connected
with any particular poisonous chemicals which might have been employed
by the enemy during the terror-raid. " [emphasis in original,
DOD 235f]
The issue is confirmed also in mortuary literature, which clarifies
the details of the Kassel report:
The first sign of putrefaction is a greenish skin discoloration
appearing on the right lower abdomen about the second or third day
after death. [...] Both color and smell are produced by sulphur
containing intestinal gas and a breakdown of red blood cells.
Under normal conditions, the intestinal bacteria in a corpse
produce large amounts of foul-smelling gas that flows into the blood
vessels and tissues. It is this gas that bloats the body, turns
the skin green to purple to black, makes the tongue and eyes protrude,
and often pushes the intestines out through the vagina or rectum.
The gas also causes large amounts of foul-smelling blood-stained
fluid to exude from the nose, mouth and other body orifices. [I42]
This last is no doubt a reference to the "Leichenwasser" or "corpse-water"
described above, which occurs as the internal organs liquefy [I 43],
as well as a confirmation of such descriptions as "The bottom steps
were slippery. The cellar floor was covered by an eleven or twelve inch
deep liquid mixture of blood, flesh and bone." [D194]
The Kassel Report, supplemented by the mortuary literature, is important
in several respects. In the first place it makes it clear that putrefaction
could engender a wide variety of hues and it is possible that fire and
heat even extended this palette [H315]. Thus the claim of multi-colored
corpses is strikingly confirmed. Secondly, the mere issuance of the
report indicates not only a widespread ignorance of the discoloration
that attends dead bodies, but also the wide-spread, if not paranoid,
assumption that discolored corpses must have been killed with poison
gas. This will be, I believe, an important factor to consider when evaluating
Allied reports from the last days of the war. But finally, the fears
of the populace with regards to the danger of poison gas were in a sense
justified: although the fact was not publicized at the time, many of
the victims had died from carbon monoxide poisoning, which is, after
all, a poison gas.
1.7 Firestorms and Carbon Monoxide
Carbon monoxide deaths were usually brought on by the fires set by the
Allied bombers' incendiary bombs. To grasp the widespread nature of
such deaths, we must first explain the nature of firestorms, which,
in turn, will not only explain the high incidence of carbon monoxide
poisoning but also some other seemingly fantastic claims pertaining
to the victims of air raids.
Graphic 1-15: Two Hamburg women who probably succumbed to carbon
monoxide.
Firestorms are caused when a number of small fires converge into a
single blaze, creating a huge conflagration which in turn sucks in oxygen
at high speeds and at very high temperatures. In Hamburg, the conflagration
eventually enveloped 4 1/2 square miles, developed 100 mph winds [G110],
and reached temperatures of at least 600 to 800 degrees Centigrade [US19](other
firestorms have been said to generate temperatures of 1,500 to 2,000
degrees Centigrade). [H314] By way of comparison it should be noted
that startup temperatures for crematoria are between 600 and 700 degrees
Centigrade. [I262]
Under such conditions "flash overs" or incidences of spontaneous combustion
were not uncommon. [G103] Several testimonies refer to people in the
street or in apparent safety in a park who would suddenly have their
clothing burst into flames with no apparent trigger by way of a spark.
The same conditions could be found in the cellars, many which were too
hot to excavate until weeks after the raid: when a cellar was reopened,
it was not uncommon for the inrush of oxygen to cause the remains of
victims or coal and coke supplies to burst into flames. [US23,G167]
Carbon monoxide gas played a major role in the fatalities, particularly
in incendiary raids, which were the type usually employed against population
centers. Although this development was unexpected, it was soon recognized
as the typical cause of death for those found in underground cellars
or bunkers. [US24f] It was also a frequent cause of death for aboveground
casualties, because the concentrations of the gas were so great in the
streets and because heart attacks and other pathologies could result
from exposure to less than lethal levels. [US24f] In Wesermunde, for
example, of 210 people killed in a fire caused by an air raid, 175 perished
from carbon monoxide poisoning. [US24] Of the victims of the Hamburg
raid, apart from mechanical injuries, 70% were poisoned with the lethal
gas. [US24] It should be noted that carbon monoxide would be generated
not only from incomplete combustion but also by exploding bombs: gas
from a high explosive shell would contain 60% to 70% carbon monoxide.
[US24] The Germans attempted to develop a number of tests that would
test carbon monoxide hemoglobin in corpses even after putrefaction.
The indications are simply astonishing: while CO levels of .5% can kill,
some bodies found in bomb shelters contained concentrations of up to
95%. [US25]
Aside from forensic tests, the influence of the poisonous gas could
usually be detected by inspecting the posture of the remains. Because
carbon monoxide is odorless, tasteless and invisible, it is possible
to inhale a lethal dose without knowing it and then simply fall into
a deep sleep. As a result most carbon monoxide victims showed a relaxed
and unthreatened posture when found: the death was painless and came
without any premonition. [US25] The authorities faced a dilemma with
the results of their surveys because there were no effective preventive
measures to take. As a result, the secret of the CO poison gas threat
was concealed from the public. [US25] The Strategic Bombing Survey would
report after the war:
In all the cities visited, carbon monoxide poisoning was regarded
as the primary cause of death or injury, sometimes reaching to as
much as 80% of all incendiary raid casualties. [US28]
As already suggested, cleanup after the raids was a daunting proposition.
Many of the dead were lying naked in the streets, and it is known that
many had stripped down to their shoes to avoid flash over.
Graphic 1-16: A Hamburg casualty literally roasted by heat, not
flames.
Initially, the corpses would swell, but after a few hours "the bodies
shrunk to small objects with hard brownish black skin and charring of
different parts and frequently to ashes and complete disappearance."
[US22] This description, from the US Strategic Bombing Survey, shows
three photographs of shelter dead, who have been between 50% to 80%
cremated -- the presence of hair and even clothing indicates that the
destruction was achieved through high heat alone, and not through exposure
to flame. [US17-21,cf. Figs. 8,14-16]
Access to the shelters could take months, and this would affect not
only the body counts but also the appearance of the remains. The lack
of escape movements indicated carbon monoxide poisoning in the absence
of testing [US25]. The odor of putrefaction was a frequent clue to the
location of the dead, except in cases where total cremation had occurred.
[US23] Bodies were often found "lying in a thick greasy black mass which
was without doubt melted fat tissue." [US23] The systematic shrinkage,
probably caused by the burning which removed the water mass, led the
Germans to call such victims Bombenbrandschrumpfleichen or "firebombshrunken
bodies" [US23]. "Many basements contained only bits of ashes and in
these cases the number of casualties could only be estimated." [US23]
Of course, given the temperatures that are known to have been achieved
in the course of a firestorm none of these characterizations should
be surprising. As Gordon Musgrove, a highly decorated pilot for Bomber
Command, has noted:
"The enormous heat seems to have turned the cellars and underground
shelters into crematoria. The exits and emergency exits were surrounded
by fires; steel doors, specially installed as a safety precaution,
became red-hot or jammed; ceilings, weakened by excessive heat,
collapsed under the weight of falling masonry; and even when they
were not actually invaded by fire, many rooms were made untenable
by smoke or fumes." [G94]
Musgrove was at least half right. The inhabitants of the shelters found themselves
in the abnormal situation of hiding in their basements while their buildings
burned above them. As the intensive heat dried them out and turned their
faces puffy and red before heat stroke set in, the deadly concentrations
of carbon monoxide would slowly and silently kill them. The cellars
and underground shelters were both crematoria and gas chambers combined.
END OF PART 1 --
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