Defending Against the Allied Bombing Campaign: Air Raid Shelters
and Gas Protection in Germany, 1939-1945
Part 1
RECENTLY THE ARGUMENT has been advanced
that each of the crematoria at Birkenau was equipped with a gas-tight
bomb shelter. The argument was first made in the Summer of 1996 by Arthur
R. Butz, with respect to Crematoria II and III in his
Vergasungskeller article. [1]
In the Spring of 1997 the concept was extended to cover all of the crematoria
in Birkenau in my article Technique and
Operation of German Anti-Gas Shelters in World War Two [hereinafter,
Technique]. [2]
Although the identification
of these spaces as gas-tight bomb shelters was corroborated in Technique
by extensive reference to contemporary German civil defense literature,
public acceptance of the thesis has been slow. Part of the reason, no
doubt, is that the "Bomb Shelter Thesis" contradicts the work of Jean
Claude Pressac and others, notably, Robert Jan van Pelt. [3] In addition
we must recognize that the thesis, in either the Butz or Crowell variant,
seems at first glance both unusual and even extraordinary.
But the argument for bomb shelters in the Birkenau crematoria seems
extraordinary only because the scope of the German civil defense program
is so little known. Hence, when the crematoria are identified as having
had gas tight bomb shelters the first reaction of the skeptic will be,
why would there be alterations for the crematoria to serve as air raid
shelters? Why not other buildings? without recognizing that similar
shelters were quite common in Germany, and, we believe it possible to
show, also in the concentration camp system and Auschwitz-Birkenau in
particular. So it should be clear that the argument for gas-tight bomb
shelters in the Birkenau crematoria is strengthened to the extent that
analogous structures can be shown to have existed both in the concentration
camp system as well as in German cities.
The
present article is an attempt to carry the argument for comparison and
corroboration forward, in this case by supplementing the contemporary
civil defense literature cited in Technique with secondary studies
of German civil defense in World War Two, comprising both recent German
studies as well as US government studies prepared in the immediate postwar
period. The result will be the broader realization, widely recognized
in the secondary literature, that gas tight bomb shelters were a common
feature on the wartime German civilian and concentration camp landscape.
We will begin by reviewing the rules and recommendations for German
civil defense, and will find that the precautions the Germans took for
bomb and gas attacks were extensive. A review of the actual types of
structures will show a wide array of constructions, including adaptations
of natural geologic formations, existing structures for secondary bomb
shelter use, covered trenches for concentration camp internees, and
a particular emphasis on above ground structures, all of which were
designed to defend against both bombs and gas attacks. Provisions for
gas-tight doors, including those that would lock from the outside, reinforced
concrete roofs, including those with brick ventilation shafts, and gas-filtering
ventilation systems will be shown to have been quite common, according
to both the documentary evidence and the oral testimony of the men,
women, and children who took part in the large civil defense network.
In addition, we will note the particular emphasis placed on chemical
decontamination facilities, which would usually be sited in only a few
dual-purpose locations in a city, and which, along with the specially
trained decontamination crews, would also be used to combat vermin and
the spread of infectious diseases, including typhus.
In the course of such a review we cannot pass by the opportunity to
describe some of the circumstances whereby the Germans used this civil
defense apparatus to maximum advantage, overcoming terror, destruction,
and massive casualties to survive and endure. For if the story of the
civil defense precautions in the concentration camp system is little
known, so too has the German people's battle for survival in the Allied
bombing campaign been largely ignored.
Part 1: Civil Defense in Germany
1.1 Regulations
It was generally accepted after
World War One that aerial bombardment would be a feature of any future
war, and that civilian populations would be targets. "Strategic" bombing
in this sense was a kind of indirect warfare, meant to rupture the enemy's
economy or demoralize its population so that the enemy army would be
forced to capitulate. [4] Such indirect warfare is a classic feature
of siege warfare as well as naval blockade, the last circumstance may
explain why Great Britain became the leading practitioner of strategic
area bombing in World War Two. A famous expression of Britain's point
of view was made by Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons on November
10, 1932:
"I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that there
is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever
people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only
defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women
and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."
[H43f, S12]
Recognizing such a position, Germany made
attempts to protect itself passively from future air attack even in
the 1920's, even though active defense -- searchlights, flak guns, and
so on -- were forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. [S11] Already in
1931 the Ministry of the Interior was issuing guidelines for civil defense,
and in 1932 the first issue of the Vorl�ufige Ortsanweisung f�r den
Luftschutz der Zivilbev�lkerung was issued, which, by war's end
would comprise 12 chapters with numerous comprehensive attachments.
[S12]
After Hitler took power Germany began
preparing mobilization plans, and these included provision for the defense
of cities. The mobilization plans of the Luftwaffe included a special
attachment breaking down the cities of Germany into Civil Defense Areas
(Luftschutzorten) of Class I, II, and III. [S14] The difference
in classes was primarily a matter of local control, inspection, and
preparedness. The controls would be in the hands of the Luftschutzleiter
(civil defense leader) usually the mayor or sometimes the local Nazi
gauleiter. The 104 cities in Class I (or LSO-I) included all
cities with large populations, and other cities that were considered
vital for war industries. Thus Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, and Dresden
were naturally LSO-I: but so was Siegen, with a population of
60,000. Siegen's inclusion was based on its location near the Ruhr,
its status as a garrison city, and its war important industries.[S16]
It would be tedious to go over the voluminous regulations governing
the civil defense establishment in Germany from 1933 forwards, but there
are two documents that deserve special attention: The Code of Practice
for Building Shelters [Bestimmungen f�r den Bau von Luftschutz
Bunkern] and the orders pertaining to the Luftschutz F�hrer Sofort
Programm, that is, the Fuhrer's Emergency Air Raid Program,
usually referred to as the LS-F�hrerprogramm.
The United States, in its postwar surveys, stressed the detailed nature
of the Code and its provisions.[CD152f] In fact, the Code
also laid down basic guidelines in which civil defense had to be viewed.
The basic concepts turned on the collective nature of the enterprise:
any program was to cover the whole city, and the program had to be worked
into any urban development programs. The Code gave preference
to above ground shelters, because underground shelters were costlier.
In addition, it specified various details, such as the number of gas-locks
for entry (preferably, two), the width of entries, the size of the staircases,
the need for washrooms, first aid rooms, and so on. [CD153]
If the Code underlay Germany's civil defense approach, the
LS-F�hrerprogramm of November, 1940, stressed the same points with
greater detail and greater urgency. By the time of its issuance, Germany
was reconciled to a long air war, therefore the details of the program
were meant to be comprehensive and prescriptive, as a listing of some
of its provisions show:
1. For buildings (municipal buildings, dwellings, lots) in which
there are up to now none or inadequate air raid shelters, do it
yourself air raid measures will be adopted.
2. Existing
or newly constructed streets or transportation paths (e.g., subways
and tunnels) are to be adapted for the construction of underground
and bombproof air raid shelters.
3. The openings to
the outside in existing air raid shelters are to be removed and
at the same time connections are to be made [to other shelters]
with collapsible fire walls.
4. New public air raid
shelters are to be constructed, and existing air raid shelters are
to be made, as bombproof as possible.
5. All new constructions,
particularly in buildings for the armaments industry, are henceforth
to be equipped with bombproof air raid shelters. Such shelters are
to have the same priority as the structure being built itself. [S23f,
N327ff]
1. F�r Wohngebiete (st�dtische
Gebiete, Siedlungen, Laubenkolonien), in denen bisher keine oder
unzureichende Luftschutzr�ume vohanden sind, sind behelfsma�ige
Luftschutzma�nahmen zu treffen.
2. Vorhandene oder neu zu bauende
Verkehrsstra�en oder Verkehrsanlagen (z.B. Untergrundbahnen und
Tunnelbauten) sind f�r den Bau unterirdischer, bombensicherer Luftschutzr�ume
auszunutzen.
3. Die in Luftschutzr�umen vorhandenen �ffnungen
in den Au�enwanden des Geb�udes sind zu beseitigen unter gleichzeitiger
beschleunigter Durchf�hrung der gesetzlich geordneten Brandmauerdurchbruche.
4. Neu zu errichtende �ffentliche Luftschutzr�ume sind bombensicher
zu bauen, die vorhandenen �ffentlichen Luftschutzr�ume sind -- soweit
m�glich -- auf Bombensicherheit zu verst�rken.
5. Bei allen Neubauten,
insbesondere bei den Bauten der R�stungsindustrie, sind von vorneherein
bomensichere Luftschutzr�ume auszuf�hren. Sie sind in die gleiche
Dringlichkeitsstufe wie die Bauvorhaben selbst aufzunehmen.
A few clarifications to the program are necessary.
The openings to the outside that needed to be closed has to do with
the demonstrated insecurity for some emergency exits; this would lead
eventually to the filling in of emergency exit passages with sand, or
boxes of gravel, or even the filling in with a narrow wall. Second,
the Brandmauerdurchbruch, or collapsible fire wall, was meant
to connect a series of buildings, such as one would find in large cities.
Such an expedient would of course be useless in situations where a building
was isolated. The most striking thing about the LS-F�hrerprogramm,
aside from the extensive construction that followed after it was issued,
is the fact that it was global: all buildings, new or old, were to be
equipped with bomb shelters.
1.2 Organization of Civil
Defense in Cities
The organization for Civil Defense
in Germany was extremely widespread. The Reichsluftschutzbund
(hereinafter, RLB) [5] numbered 12 million members by 1939 [B13],
and it is only reasonable to assume that its numbers swelled as the
war continued. Each city had a complicated hierarchy of positions and
departments whose functions were clearly marked out.
The basic structure was the Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst (SHD,
Recue and Repair Service), which was further subdivided. The Sicherheitsdienst
(S-Dienst) functioned as security and police in the event of
air raids, the Feuerl�schdienst (F-Dienst) were the firefighting
crews, the Instandsetsungsdienst (I-Dienst) were charged
with technical and emergency repairs, including bomb disposal and the
rescue of bombing victims, and the Sanitatdienst (San-Dienst)
worked closely with the Red Cross and the municipal health authorities
in handling all problems of health, emergency care, and hygiene that
grew out of the bombing raids. There was even a special department devoted
to veterinary care, with emergency stations for the care of draft animals
and pets. [N46-143]
The final division of
the civil defense forces was the Entgiftungsdienst or the Decontamination
Service. The decontamination workers were normally attached to the firefighters,
and indeed in Nuremberg they were amalgamated with the firefighters
in 1940, so that the gas protection function of the E-Dienst
became auxiliary [N77]. Already by 1939, Nuremberg, with a population
of about 450,000, had 15 decontamination squads with 15 NCOs and 300
men, in addition, there were 56 gas testers (Gassp�rer) attached
to the central authority. [N48] The role of the gas testers were to
follow up on any suspicions of gas usage and take samples to one of
25 gas testing labs. Other fixed sites related to the work of the Decontamination
Service included five decontamination centers with 5 NCOs and 20 men,
and five centers for the decontamination of materials (Sachenentgiftungsanstalten)
also divided among 25 personnel. The location of these stations is difficult
to establish today but it is clear that they made use of existing locations
that featured laundries and public bathing facilities [N78, CD164].
It seems probable also that the municipal disinfection center (several
German cities possessed these) was earmarked for dual purpose [6]. The
example in the city of Nuremberg can safely be extrapolated to Germany
at large, not least because of the global nature of the US Strategic
Bombing Survey's report which covers German gas protection measures
in detail.[CD164f].
The members of the Decontamination
Service throughout Germany were issued special protective clothing,
including rubberized suits and boots, and, like other important personnel
in the Civil Defense Program, had higher quality gas masks (some 12
million gas masks in all were distributed). [CD153,CD164] The US Strategic
Survey Final Report considered it significant that the production of
this anti-gas warfare gear continued until the end of the war.[CD164]
In addition, the members of the decontamination squads received special
training: of the 150 hours of instruction for these auxiliary firefighters,
no less than 25 1/2 hours were devoted to chemical warfare.[N78] On
the other hand, in order to reduce anxiety, the average citizen received
only about a half hour of chemical warfare instruction. [CD165]
In addition to the decontamination squads, gas testers, the various
fixed sites and their work crews, gas protection also included trucks
and even ships equipped with cleansing apparatus, and chemicals and
decontamination equipment, including trucks and supplies held in reserve
to be sent to afflicted areas.[CD164f]
As
to the application of gas protection features to air raid shelters,
it was a given that bombproof also meant gasproof, as one author remarks:
"Particular attention had to be given to the entrances to the bunkers.
Each bunker had to have at least two entrances and each entrance had
to be equipped with a gaslock. It was understood that bombproof meant
proof against gas bombs!" [S40] and the US Strategic Bombing Survey
stated "All buildings and public shelters constructed or modified to
house air-raid protection activities were gas proof." [CD164] Further
evidence of the pervasive nature of gas protection in Germany can be
found in Technique.
1.3 Types of Shelters and
Equipment
Secondary sources pertaining to the civil
defense procedures of individual cities are a good source of information
on the types of shelters erected. But an extremely useful summary of
such structures can also be found in an essentially contemporary publication
of the US government, the Civil Defense Division Final Report,
issued in its second edition in January, 1947.
The most basic shelter was the home shelter, or do it yourself shelter
(Behelfm�ssige Luftschutzraum) such as one would find in private
homes or apartment buildings. Since some 22 million Germans lived in
58 cities of 100,000 or more [H128], and there were 104 cities with
priority civil defense classification (i.e., Luftschutzort I)
[S15], we can imagine that there must have been literally hundreds of
thousands of cellars that were fitted out with at least minimal bomb
and gas protection. Here, the numerous "how-to" articles in periodicals
such as Gasschutz und Luftschutz indicate the extent of the preparation.
According the the US Strategic Bombing Survey, such shelters were subject
to inspection and approval by the local authorities [CD155] and had
to meet the following specifications: (1) at least rudimentary gas-proofing,
(2) at least one emergency exit (usually to an adjoining cellar through
a Brandmauerdurchbruch, or collapsible fire wall), (3) the sealing
of all other openings to the outside, and (4) in some cases rudimentary
struts of wooden beams or brick. [CD155] The costs for such private
shelters was frequently subsidized by the government [CD155] : a wise
move, since during the heavy raids the line between private and public
shelters was frequently erased. As can be imagined such basic basement
shelters provided only marginal support in the heaviest raids, but the
insistence on gas proofing is certainly significant in evaluating the
importance and pervasiveness of anti-gas measures.
Graphic 1-3: Plans for a basement bomb shelter
A secondary category involved semi-public shelters which included schools
and other municipal buildings. These were probably the most numerous
of the various dual purpose shelters that served a public function;
the US Strategic Bombing Survey specifies that they were equipped with
gas-tight steel doors.[CD156] The problem with such converted shelters
is that in some parts of the country, notably in the East and South,
the building of communal shelters was delayed until late in the war,
precisely at the point when building materials were most difficult to
obtain. For example, Bavaria was long called the "Air Raid Shelter of
Germany" on the understanding that it would not be bombed because of
its distance from Britain. This assumption also led to the "Kinder
Land Verschickung" a program in which children were evacuated from
the North and West to the South. [US214] But from 1943 onwards all parts
of the country would be bombed, and this probably explains the variability
in the children's death toll, ranging from 10% in places like Hamburg
and Nuremberg to 30% in cities like Darmstadt (see discussion below)
because the children in the latter locations would not have been evacuated.
Acceptable bomb and gas protection seem to have been widely available
in converted shelters, as we shall see, but given the nature of the
firestorm raids from 1943 onwards these would be of little help; cities
like Munich, Augburg, and Dresden, were seriously affected by a lack
of preparedness.
Of the dedicated public shelters,
there were several types. Probably the most numerous of these were the
trench shelters, such as one would find in the labor camps and concentration
camps, these will be discussed in more detail later. Stollen
were also found, and were essentially semicircular tunnels bored into
a hillside, although often downtown underground bunkers would mimic
the structure of Stollen. Since the vertical protection would
depend on the height of the hill being bored into, we can imagine that
they were quite secure, the main problem with such shelters could only
be built where the lay of the land would support them. And there were
occasional design lapses: one Stollen in Stuttgart, designed
to hold 1,000, was notorious for lacking any restrooms. [S99]
Another common shelter, particularly in the cities, were large Luftschutzbunkern.
Sometimes these involved the expansion of existing basements, or the
digging of sub-basements. The floor plans for some of these shelters
are mind-boggling in size, one that was inspected could hold 10,000
people. [CD157] Although priority was given to above ground shelters,
the Germans ended up building many underground because of the lack of
space, particularly in the centers of cities. [CD157] These were usually
long, flat structures with flat roofs of reinforced concrete. Forced
ventilation was standard, with standard Schutzraumbel�fter which
were operated by electricity or by hand. Air intakes (Entl�ftungsrohren)
would usually be equipped with a gas-tight flap, as drawings indicate,
[S77] sometimes the air intake would have a large and heavily sloped
brick chimney, which, due to the slope, would occupy a mass many times
greater than the aperture. [N569] It was apparently not unusual to use
vent pipes for camouflage purposes. [CD162]
Graphic 1-4: A Hochbunker, or above ground bomb shelter
The large Hochbunker or above ground
bunker was a German innovation that had no counterpart among the Allies.
They were usually large concrete blocks built above ground and designed,
like the Luftschutz bunkern, for multiple use: for people, important
documents, artworks. Eventual peace-time use was envisioned for the
Hochbunkern: indeed, in Hamburg many of these would be converted
to office blocks after the war. [G69] They could be classed in various
categories, including those that were provided with false roofs and
painted-on windows that looked like gigantic chateaux, others that resembled
squat skyscrapers with bricked in windows, still others that were round
and faced with brick like the keep of a castle, and still others that
looked like tapered towers. [S26ff, CD157f]
Graphic 1-5: Bomb shelter design, perhaps an attempt at disguising
the purpose.
Although above
ground shelters would seem particularly vulnerable because they were
exposed, in practice they seem to have worked quite well. Since they
were of concrete, they were not set ablaze, and since they were detached
from other buildings they were not as directly affected by other burning
buildings; hence the effects of heat or gases would not be as great.
In the Hamburg raids of late July 1943, the second to last of which
created the famous firestorm, only 100 people in above ground shelters
perished, largely as a result of two direct hits on smaller structures.
Considering that more than 50,000 people were killed that night and
that over eleven hundred tons of high explosives were expended that
seems a remarkably low total.
Perhaps one
of the most unusual public air raid shelters was the Parkh�hle
in Weimar. The Parkh�hle is a long jagged series of caves that
underlay the city, several hundred meters in length, caused by water
cutting through the rock formations. Long a tourist attraction, the
Parkh�hle was converted to bomb shelter use late in the war,
with some brick strutting done, as well as the provision of some other
equipment. Because of its size, it was not felt necessary to ventilate
its long corridors. The caves were also the site of extensive archaeological
work by Johann Wolfgang Goethe and his son: the ethnographic museums
of Weimar today still display their finds of ancient bones and other
materials from the Old Stone Age. [P19ff,49]
As the discussion in Technique has already noted, ventilation
in the air raid shelters was a problem insofar as it had to provide
sufficient air per person (11 cubic feet per minute), had to provide
temperatures in the acceptable range (24 C to 17C), and provide for
humidity control. [CD158] In addition, the more secure shelters would
be flooded with refugees in the event of severe raids. Overcrowding
was always a problem.
It is difficult to reconstruct
the number of shelters or the types of shelters built before and during
the war, but various indications from the secondary literature provides
a number of clues. It is known, for example, that Hamburg had over 2,000
public shelters for about 500,000 persons out of a population of over
1 million. [G69] Wuppertal, with a population of 400,000, built or converted
over 100 shelters. [S98] Since Hamburg was one of the better prepared
cities in the Reich, it is a safe inference that the rest of the residents
were distributed in smaller home shelters and LS-Kellern, the
colloquial name for the cellars of apartment buildings adapted for bomb
shelter use. [N442] Dresden, on the other hand, had no dedicated public
shelters, and only a few converted public shelters, yet home and apartment
protection appears to have been up to standard. [D166f]
A detailed study of the city of Siegen provides information that we
could extrapolate to the rest of the Reich. Under the LS-F�hrerprogramm,
over 10 million RM was spent in the construction of 17 large public
shelters, another 6 million for 8 Stollen, and close to another
million in the conversion of 100 or so existing buildings to semi-public
shelters. For a total outlay of over 17 million Reichsmarks, Siegen
was able to provide adequate public shelter for about 20% of its population
of 60,000, the rest falling back on home and cellar shelters. [S86]
There is also the case of Nuremberg. Early in the course of the LS-F�hrerprogramm,
four shelters were designed for a cost of 3.6 million RM, even though
the city began the war with dozens of public shelters. [N385] In 1943,
the budget called for 52 new public shelters, the improvement of 294
old shelters, and the strutting and splinterproofing of of 3,600 home
shelters for a cost of one and a half million RM.[N450] But neither
in Nuremberg, nor in any other city, was funding, principally by the
government, ever lacking -- "Geld war genug da" -- the money
was always there. [N385] Further data on Nuremberg indicates that in
1942 there were 13,500 Keller�ume, that is, shelters for home
and apartment dwellers. [N446]
Graphic 1-6: A bunker for the storage of artworks in Nuremberg
Considering that there were over 12 million in the Luftschutzbund
in 1939, that over 22 million Germans lived in 58 cities highly vulnerable
to air attack (over 75 cities were essentially leveled by the RAF alone)
[H374f] we can easily arrive at the conclusion that the program built
thousands of dedicated public shelters, tens of thousands of semi-public
conversions, and hundreds of thousands of home and cellar shelters at
a total cost of billions of Marks.
1.4 German Civil
Defense in Practice
The test for the German civil defense
system came when the bombs started to fall. In spite of the careful
planning, many precautions would not function in firestorm conditions.
Then survival became a matter of luck, desperate courage, or strong
leadership among the RLB Feldwebeln (sergeant majors),
and fire wardens.
Under normal conditions
the system seemed to operate well enough, with the usual precautions
functioning normally. Thus one man would recall his boyhood experiences:
"I was a Hitler Youth messenger. As such, I was stationed at an
air raid shelter bunker built both above ground and underground.
When an air raid alarm sounded, we had to be there on time and open
the bunker with the "block leader", a party official who was responsible
for the street. We had to care for the children, give them milk,
and so on, if the alarm lasted a long time. [...] The block leader
or the women from the Nazi's women's organization sent around and
handed out toys to the children and light sedatives to the adults.
And the louder the attack got outside, the quieter it got in the
bunker.
"The underground shelters were more like "tube
bunkers." When you came through the steel door, fitted with rubber
around the edges to make it airtight, you entered a diagonal hallway.
This hallway was joined by three or four tube-like hallways perpendicular
to it. Each of these, in turn, was a separate bunker. Air was pumped
through each tube by machines which we Hitler Youth operated. That
was one of our jobs. My duties also involved running messages from
one bunker to another if the telephones went dead. We were outfitted
with gas masks, steel helmets, etc. We had to go out at all times,
even when the bombs were falling. I was 13 years old at the time."
[V211]
Graphic 1-6: A messenger boy in Hamburg who didn't make it through
the firestorm. Very little remains of his body except a partial skeleton.
The above not only indicates the ordinariness
of underground shelters, gas tight steel doors, and hand-cranked ventilators
but also the integral role that women and children played in civil defense.
One woman, in Dresden, describes surviving the American daylight raid
after the famous firestorm:
"Normally, there were only 20 to 25 of us down in the cellar. But
now, with many people off the street, including those who'd stopped
over at our house, there were about 100 of us. Nevertheless, no
on panicked -- we were too numb and demoralized from the night before.
We just sat there. The attack rolled closer, and then a bomb hit.
It was like a bowling ball that bounced, or jumped perhaps, and
at that moment the lights went out. The whole basement filled with
dust. When the bomb carpet reached us, I crouched in a squatting
position, my head between my legs. The air pressure was immense,
but only for a moment. The rubber seals on the windows and the steel
doors probably helped to absorb some of the impact. Someone screamed,
and then it was quiet. Then a voice shouted, 'It's all right, nothing's
happened.' It was the shelter warden." [V231]
The above quote is informative in a couple of ways.
It describes the typical gas tight seals on steel doors and windows.
Such fixtures appear to have been common, even in Dresden, where virtually
no large public shelters were especially built. [S99f,D166f] In addition,
the role of the shelter warden in maintaining calm in the shelters is
suggested. Indeed, it appears in several cases that the survival of
thousands if not tens of thousands depended on the leadership and resource
of the Feldwebeln (Sergeant Majors) Branddirektors (Fire
Wardens) and the roving rescue squads of the SHD. The experiences
of Sergeant Major Sch�fer and Fire Warden Bey of the Hamburg RLB,
as related to Gordon Musgrove for his Operation Gomorrah,
are both typical and extraordinary. [G71f,73f,91f]
Graphic 1-7: A gas tight door for an air-raid shelter at Nuremberg
Sch�fer was bombed out of his own apartment the day before the firestorm
and had moved down the street to take up residence. When the firestorm
raid began, he withdrew to the shelter of his new building, along with
about 400 others. Over the course of the next half hour or so, he was
led to make several trips out of the shelter into the flames, in order
to determine the extent of the damage, from which he determined very
early on the need for immediate evacuation. And here we encounter a
common theme in shelter rescues: the need for forceful and even brutal
leadership to save lives.
In Sch�fer's case,
his shouted demand for evacuation was greeted with fear and apathy;
a reaction often cited in the air war literature. Sch�fer's response
was immediate: he grabbed the first two people near the exit by the
scruff of their necks, dragged them up and out into the flaming street,
and took them down to the corner to point out the way to safety in a
nearby park. He repeated this exercise several more times, leading out
by force a number of women and their children, which in turn brought
everyone else out. When everyone had exited the shelter, he followed
behind. On the way, he broke into a building that was not yet in flames,
rescuing another party there, then made several dashes into the street
to save women whose clothing had caught fire, passed out and was revived
by some his people, retreated to the park with them, found temporary
relief from a water tower, and finally, after several hours, was rescued
with his full complement several blocks further away. There seems little
doubt that without Sch�fer's energetic leadership his party would not
have survived, for the building from which they escaped collapsed minutes
after his departure. What makes his self-control and presence of mind
even more remarkable is that the last person to leave his shelter was
his wife, and and as she did so she handed him their three month old
child.
At this point it is necessary to pause
and understand why there would be so much reluctance to leave the shelters.
Most of the city raids were fire-raisers and several culminated in firestorms.
Outside one had to contend with exploding bombs (including delayed action
bombs), bomb splinters, falling masonry or entire buildings, and wooden
roofing and construction beams that would fly around in the storm winds
like matchsticks. In addition, all commentators make reference to a
kind of continual shower of sparks, using metaphors like "swarms of
fiery bumblebees", or "blizzards of red snow": these sparks could not
only burn and blind but could also set one's clothes on fire. Finally,
there was the heat, the gusting winds that would whipsaw back and forth
and create clouds of sparks and debris at intersections, and which would
reduce many trying to escape to crawling on all fours. Under these circumstances
the difficulty in breathing was terrible, oftentimes one finds the comment
"the air just wouldn't come" and similar sentiments. [US22] One warden,
standing outside his shelter, was seized with a terrifying premonition
of his own death, and not long after, suddenly passed out. Mercifully,
he was right outside of a Hochbunker, and was dragged back in
to safety. [G98] Another survivor describes falling to the ground and
being forced to breathe off the pavement during the firestorm, burning
his lips and mouth in the process. After an hour and a half the crisis
had passed. Dead people were laying all around him. [G111f] In the Dresden
raid, a survivor described a group of young girls who finally took the
risk to dash across a courtyard and open a gate that would allow them
to escape from the fires. Yet, as they were struggling with the gate,
a building nearby collapsed, killing all of them. [D170] Seeing or hearing
of such situations no doubt led many, and particularly women, women
with children, and the elderly, to forsake the frightening uncertainty
outside for what they believed would be the comparative security of
the bunker. And these people rarely survived.
The leadership and professionalism of the air raid crews were of particular
importance during firestorms, for here the elaborate systems of precaution
frequently broke down. Collective protector ventilation systems might
start bellowing smoke; emergency exits and shutters might crash in from
the impact of bombs and offer no more protection; fire walls might be
broken down in an effort to escape only to bring in lethal fire and
smoke. Here again the human element made the difference between life
and death.
Fire Warden
Bey was another air raid leader in Hamburg. When the firestorm raid
on Hamburg began, he was walking around the block, gathering up stragglers,
but he too was soon forced to retreat to his shelter. Within a matter
of minutes the street was ablaze and the shelter was becoming overcrowded
with people from outside or from other shelters that had failed, some
of whose clothes were already smoldering, others who had ripped them
off to avoid the flames. The ventilation system soon broke down and
the lighting soon failed; and, while he had no real hopes of fixing
it, Bey made a shrewd display of instructing a few men to work on it,
hoping that that would placate his anxious crowd and give them hope.
Meanwhile, Bey and one of his NCO's went out on a number of patrols
looking for help or safety. No clear escape route was found, nor did
they find any emergency squads, who were roaming the blazing city in
trucks, but they did find some water which they carried back to the
bunker, which by now was extremely overcrowded. A series of cracks made
in the connecting walls with other cellars did not lead to safety either,
but brought even more dazed survivors into the shelter.
Going out into the street one more time, Bey finally flagged down a
Major of the SHD with a rescue party and organized an evacuation.
Returning to his shelter, Bey found that his people had given up all
hope, but finally he was able to coax a few to follow him out so that
he could explain the plan. No sooner had he stepped onto the street
to encourage the others to join him, when two adjoining buildings collapsed,
knocking him down and covering him with dust and debris. Meanwhile,
his observers panicked and dashed back to safety. Bey got to his feet
and returned to the shelter, and finally succeeded in goading and hectoring
his people into the street. One by one the people from the shelter stepped
out, encouraged by an exhausted Bey, forming a human chain down two
streets and into a park. After inspecting the shelter one last time,
he followed behind where he found all of his people in safety. Clearly
the tenacity and perseverance of Fire Warden Bey was instrumental in
their survival, but so too were the roving squads of the SHD,
who abandoned their role of fire monitoring and fire fighting early
on in order to save as many lives as possible. In this particular case,
the lives of more than 700 were spared.
A
particularly harrowing example of rescue concerns the city of Brunswick,
which was bombed on October 15, 1944. Here the breakdown concerned what
in retrospect would seem both foolish and tragic: the tendency of some
shelter doors to be locked and bolted from the outside to prevent panicked
civilians from rushing outside prematurely. The raid began at 2:30 in
the morning and had developed a minor firestorm in the city center within
45 minutes. But this same area contained eight large bunkers and public
shelters which housed 23,000 people. It was impossible to get through
because of the firestorm, thus the rescue of these people depended solely
on the ingenuity of the firefighters.
By 5
AM they were ready. Hoses were leapfrogged forward group by group, throwing
up a "water alley" of protection for the next group that would detach
its hoses, move forward, reattach, and create the next segment of the
alley. Overcoming numerous complexities and failures, the firefighters
finally got through to the bunkers at 7 o'clock the next morning, and
"As the doors were unbarred and unlocked the rescuers heard the sound
of 'many people talking quietly but nervously under their breath.'"[D64f]
Then the survivors were led back to safety in an enormous human chain
under the canopy of water.
There is a tendency
when discussing war to expect the greatest demonstrations of leadership
on the battlefield, and to view civilian victims as mere passive statistics,
whose numbers are then manipulated for political purposes. Yet the narratives
that have been recounted here remind us otherwise. The leadership, courage,
and devotion to duty demonstrated by Sergeant Major Sch�fer, Fire Warden
Bey, and the Brunswick firefighters -- along with many others -- were
in the finest traditions of any military organization. They were charged
with saving as many lives as possible. At great personal risk, they
accomplished that mission.
1.5 The Total Number of Victims
Yet it must be said that hundreds of thousands died. A usual figure
for dead German civilians in the air war is about 593,000 -- most round
up to 600,000, others tend to argue for a lower figure, 300,000 to 400,000.
[H11,DD171n] Rudolf H��, the commandant of Auschwitz, insisted in his
memoirs that "the total number of victims of the air war will probably
never be found. In my estimation there were probably several million.
The casualty figures were never made public. They were top secret."
[DD171] But the value of H��' estimation is only a problem for those
who consider him reliable in other areas.
Graphic 1-8: Some of the tens of thousands of victims at Hamburg
The 593,000-600,000 figure, in turn, accepts
a low estimate for Dresden, about 35,000. But it is doubtful that the
figures for Dresden were so low. Hamburg, with a population of 1.2 million,
suffered about 50,000 in the firestorm of July 29, 1943. But this was
during the third of several attacks, and we should expect that many
had fled from the city by the time of the third attack (the overall
reduction in Hamburg's population was 43%). [G162] We know that the
population of several cities was reduced as a result of air raids: Nuremberg,
with a population of about a half million, had been halved by late in
the war. [N445] In addition, Hamburg suffered its terrific casualties
even though it was well equipped with thousands of shelters.
On the other hand, Dresden, with a pre-war population of 600,000, had
been swelled with hundreds of thousands of refugees from the East, fleeing
the Soviet army: its population at the time of the raid was probably
comparable to Hamburg's at that city's zenith. Dresden was also struck
by a firestorm: but it lacked almost all of the safeguards present in
Hamburg. There were no large Hochbunkern in Dresden where people
could wait out the storm. Death from asphyxiation would seem to be guaranteed.
Additionally, the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city would
have no way of orienting themselves or knowing how to escape: we can
assume panic among many of them, and desperate retreat into overcrowded
underground converted public shelters that would ultimately become death
traps. Moreover, since Dresden had never before been seriously bombed,
the population had neither fled, nor reduced in number, nor were they
likely well versed in procedures that would save their lives: and only
one, evacuation, would save them in the firestorm. On top of this, the
second wave of British bombers was designed to bomb the center of the
city at precisely the time when the maximum amount of aid would be in
the streets trying to save the lives of the victims from the first wave:
that percentage of losses must also be considered. Finally, the third
blow by the Americans, next day, doubtless brought its casualties, along
with the P-51 Mustangs who in several well documented instances strafed
survivors, including Allied POW's, and clearly marked hospital wings.
[D182,SF180]
Graphic 1-9: The arrows point to shelter areas.
Finally, there is the matter of accurate
counting due to the problems of cleaning up the destruction. It is well
known that tens of thousands were burned on pyres in the center city,
but bodies were still being recovered when the Soviets took over the
city on May 8, 1945. And, as in the case of other cities, the recovery
of dead bodies was not the highest priority: bodies were recovered when
possible, and there were several cases after the war when the bulldozing
of previously impassable remains turned up human remnants. [G167] Hans
Voigt of Bielefeld, whose diary was employed by David Irving in his
famous study of the Dresden raid, described his job in the gathering,
identification, and disposal of remains: his final estimate was 135,000.
[D208ff] While Hamburg is usually conceded to have caused 50,000 deaths,
it is well to keep in mind that at the time the death toll was given
out as between 30,000-40,000 [G167]: therefore, for people to assume
similar casualties at Dresden would have seemed normal at the time.
However, the conditions were definitely much worse in Dresden, for the
reasons given, and therefore it seems likely that the casualty figures
were much higher than Hamburg. In that case, Hans Voigt's projection
seems reasonable, which would mean that the overall loss of life in
the air war was in the neighborhood of 700,000.
Of the 15,802 bodies that were identifiable after the Hamburg firestorm,
6,072 were men, 7,995 were women, and 1,735 were children (children
usually meaning pre-teenage). The percentages are thus 38.4% men, 50.6%
women, and 11% children. [G167] For Darmstadt, which also experienced
a firestorm but which was not as well prepared as Hamburg, there were
936 military deaths, 368 POW deaths, and 492 foreign laborer (i.e.,
forced laborer) deaths. Of 6,637 identifiable civilian dead (twice that
many died) 1,766 were men, 2,742 were women, and 2,129 children. The
percentages are thus 26.6% men, 41.3% women, 32% children. [H325f] Other
raids show similar breakdowns, from which we conclude that the Allied
campaign directed at German civilian morale killed mostly women and
children.
There is a melancholy footnote to
the Dresden raid, which, whatever its final counting, was surely the
worst air raid in the European theater. As is well known, Churchill
proceeded with the raid because he wished to make a demonstration of
British might on the continent to the Soviets. [D148,D214] In the event,
however, the raid, which was promised to hold up communications and
transport for the front, and thus abet the Soviet offensive, was a failure:
within three days, the marshalling yards were back to limited operation,
and the city was not taken until after the war was over. [D177f] It
is interesting to note that Churchill, in his memoirs, describes his
determined effort to ensure that Eisenhower not capture the city. [D232]
One can suggest a number of reasons for this, certainly the Americans
crossed the Elbe at several other points. Popular perceptions of Dresden
continue to be informed by Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five,
a tremendously popular and widely read novel that describes the raid
as "the greatest massacre in European history." [SF101]. In opposition,
we have the occasional little-read book which assures us that the bombing
of Dresden was not a crime. As Vonnegut would say, so it goes.
1.6 After the Raids: The Nature of Victim Injuries
The morning after the raids was the time for cleanup and rescue, although
even before the raids were over the people would be out in the street;
women putting out fires, boys working water pumps for the firefighters,
members of various crews and civilians organizing ad hoc rescue
operations. The first priority was locating and rescuing survivors,
as well as treating the injured, who, as in a real battle, would far
outnumber the dead. Doctors had been privately informed that the threat
of carbon monoxide poisoning was high, even in open areas, therefore
they were told to give priority to unconscious victims ahead of those
who had only been buried, burned, or with broken bones. [US24f] And
needless to say as in regular battle the number of injuries would far
exceed the dead; in Hamburg alone 37,439 were injured seriously enough
to be counted, including many amputees and those with severe and lifelong
burns. [G167]
Graphic 1-10: Listening for signs of life under the rubble
Locating the living had its problems because
if they were in shelters their location might have been covered by tons
of brick and masonry. To help orient the crews, underground cellars
were supposed to have white paint markings several meters up the side
of the building pointing down to the air raid shelter. [N495,N540] The
I-Dienst was equipped with listening equipment, which consisted
of a console from which highly sensitive microphones were led and then
placed in piles of rubble. A photograph from the period shows two members
of a rescue crew, one gesturing for silence, as they listen intently
for the sound of breathing. [N538,N79-105] Everyone was involved in
rescues, including the forced laborers and POW's who would be trucked
in or marched in from local camps. Naturally, the prisoners and laborers
did not have much choice, but it appears that in the immediate aftermath
of a raid the political hatreds that had inspired it were forgotten
and the common denominator of humanity took over. Irving relates how
British POW's threw themselves into rescue work after Dresden, improvising
listening devices, running pipes down into the debris to provide air
to those below, putting themselves at risk to save lives. [D183,D194]
It was probably the same after all of the raids.
Graphic 1-11: A sample page from a record of the dead at Nuremberg.
The center of the bombing zone was usually
marked off, and the people were forbidden access, as Vonnegut described
it, "Germans were stopped there. They were not permitted to explore
the moon." [SF213] Then the work crews, supplemented by POW's and camp
internees, would turn to the grisly task of recovering the dead. After
the Kassel firestorm of 1943, the Police President issued suggestions
on the things that would be required by the rescue crews, including
protective suits, rubber gloves, goggles, disinfectants, and also tobacco
(probably to defeat the sense of smell), alcohol (to encourage the workers),
shears and bolt cutters to cut off the fingers of the dead wearing jewelry,
and which would later be used to identify the victims.[H320] Buckets
of rings were recovered from the Dresden dead in this fashion. [D208]
In Dresden, the devastation had been so great that there were no rubber
gloves available; an American POW describes how they improvised:
"The guard pointed at the corpse as one I should remove. He indicated
I take a belt off another body and put it around the one I was to
remove. It's surprising how much could be communicated by hand motions.
I put a belt around the neck of this man and started to drag it
towards the ramp, but [the body] broke in half. That was too much
for me. I sort of lost it for a bit. I began to scream, yell and
dance around. I tried to go out but they wouldn't let me. They got
me quieted down, pointed to one of the bottles on the table and
insisted I have a few swallows. That was the first I ever tasted
liquor of any kind." [A408]
Graphic 1-12: A young victim of the Hamburg firestorm
While It was understood that
the decontamination squads would work as firefighters until needed for
special purposes, it should be obvious that their protective clothing,
equipment, and training made them perfectly suited for activities including
corpse handling, as well as in the disinfection of shelters, where for
example "corpse water" (Leichenwasser) was found. [N77]
Graphic 1-13: A group of Nuremberg firefighters and decontamination
workers
At that point the
decontamination squads would be subordinated to the Sanitation Service
(about 1/3 of the Nuremberg decontamination personnel were so assigned)[N135],
whose duties involved not only medical care but also water purification,
corpse handling, garbage disposal, pest control, and disease control.
[N77f,N123f,N298ff] In fact in Nuremberg, in the last years of the war,
the municipal disinfection center was used not only for the combatting
of rats and flies but also for the delousing of city residents. [N123f]
The reward for these levels of sanitation prophylaxis was that German
cities were untouched by epidemics throughout the war, despite the intensive
destruction. One doctor, writing for the US Strategic Air Survey after
was war, was "incredulous" at this fact, which he initially considered
"inconceivable." [US82] His explanation focused on three factors: first,
the German people had high standards of personal cleanliness and orderliness
even under the most extreme conditions, the RLB agressively pursued
a program of education on personal hygiene, for which citizens were
required to attend six lectures each quarter throughout the war, and
finally the cooperation (Dr. Enloe calls it "docility") [US82] of the
population in such measures as boiling water after an air raid or in
laying out traps during designated rat extermination campaign.
Nevertheless, there were some outbreaks of disease, including typhus
fever, which did not appear until after "foreign laborers" had been
imported from Eastern Europe where the disease was endemic (it is assumed
that these foreign laborers constituted Soviet POWs and Eastern Jews).[US30]
Although the foreign workers and POW's were inspected, and one assumes,
deloused, twice on entering Germany, [US30f, cf. SF86] Dr. Bauer believed
that the conditions of the labor camps contributed to the outbreaks,
where overcrowding and lack of sanitation helped foster the disease,
plus the air raids which led the civilian population to freely mix with
the internees insofar as public shelters were used by both and because
evacuations usually involved both. He also cited the extension of working
hours and the lack of soap as contributing factors. Another likely influence
was the fact that the firefighting crews frequently wound up using raw
sewage in combating fires. [US63]
That the
gas decontamination squads would become involved in such activities
corpse handing, disinfection, vermin control, and delousing creates
a number of powerful associations that point to multi-pupose roles in
situations where facilities or personnel are scarce. To put it another
way, the decontamination paradigm of treatment, featuring undressing,
washing, and dressing in clean garments, is also the model for the handling
of infectious material including the disposal of the dead, as well as
for the municipal disinfection stations, and the delousing stations
in concentration camps.
Most descriptions
of the cleanup procedures contain not only wrenching but also fantastic
descriptions, particularly when dealing with the recovery of the dead.
Thus one reads of an "undulating layer of of gray ash" that are supposed
to represent firestorm victims [D45], or reductions of people to puddles,
or multi colored corpses, and so on. But unlike other fantastic descriptions
that have emerged from the war, such descriptions have a strong documentary,
forensic, and even photographic basis. After the war the United States
published studies that were based on the extensive reports prepared
by German doctors for the secret use of the German government, and these
explain the reality of these fantastic descriptions.[US, 14, 16, bibliography
p. 29]
Graphic 1-14: Victims in Hamburg
The discoloration of corpses is one feature that even historians do
not seem to clearly understand. Thus, David Irving, who describes corpses
that are blue, orange, and green seems to think that carbon monoxide
poisoning was somehow responsible [D48], while Max Hastings, who even
cites the color purple, seems to think that the discoloration was due
to pyrotechnics. [H319,H315] In short, the descriptions are not understood,
so the authors have simply projected explanations onto the situation.
And this is human nature: confronted with sights and sounds that we
do not understand, we project onto the reality an explanation that accords
either with what we have been taught, or what we expect, or simple guesswork.
Corpse discoloration also accounted for similar projections by the German
people during the course of the war. A particular case concerns the
city of Kassel after the raid of October 22, 1943. This raid, which
raised a firestorm, killed less than 8,000 out of a population of 228,000,
and it appears that the extensive precautions of the RLB were
a major factor [D46ff]. But when many of the dead were found in their
shelters days after the attack, the brilliant hues their bodies had
assumed brought forth the charge of poison gas usage. To stabilize the
situation, doctors conducted extensive postmortems; part of their report,
dated November 1, 1943, reads as follows:
"Five of the corpses selected by the chief Police-doctor in Kassel,
Herr Senior Staff Police-doctor Fehmel, were dissected at the cemetery.
The corpses concerned, of people killed during the terror-raid on
Kassel on 22.10.43, had been recovered from basements after several
days. Closer particulars are not known. Two corpses were of the
male sex and about 18-20 years old; three were of women, of which
one was between about 50 and 60 years old, the other two about 30
years old. "There were no external injuries manifest
on the corpses, which were in a condition of high-degree putrefaction.
[...] The skin was partly colored a uniform red as a result of the
hemolysis which had set in, but in extensive areas it was already
colored green. This green coloring is attributed to the action of
the ammonium sulphide with the reduced hemoglobin, which had, of
course, permeated the skin as a result of the hemolysis that had
preceded it. This green coloration, the analysis of which had
been specially stressed in the conferences in Kassel, is as such
purely a post mortem manifestation of corpses, cannot be connected
with any particular poisonous chemicals which might have been employed
by the enemy during the terror-raid. " [emphasis in original,
DOD 235f]
The issue is confirmed also in mortuary literature,
which clarifies the details of the Kassel report:
- The first sign of putrefaction is a greenish skin discoloration
appearing on the right lower abdomen about the second or third
day after death. [...] Both color and smell are produced by
sulphur containing intestinal gas and a breakdown of red blood
cells.
- Under normal conditions, the intestinal bacteria in a corpse
produce large amounts of foul-smelling gas that flows into the
blood vessels and tissues. It is this gas that bloats the body,
turns the skin green to purple to black, makes the tongue and
eyes protrude, and often pushes the intestines out through the
vagina or rectum. The gas also causes large amounts of foul-smelling
blood-stained fluid to exude from the nose, mouth and other
body orifices. [I42]
This last is no doubt a reference to the "Leichenwasser"
or "corpse-water" described above, which occurs as the internal organs
liquefy [I 43], as well as a confirmation of such descriptions as "The
bottom steps were slippery. The cellar floor was covered by an eleven
or twelve inch deep liquid mixture of blood, flesh and bone." [D194]
The Kassel Report, supplemented by the mortuary
literature, is important in several respects. In the first place it
makes it clear that putrefaction could engender a wide variety of hues
and it is possible that fire and heat even extended this palette [H315].
Thus the claim of multi-colored corpses is strikingly confirmed. Secondly,
the mere issuance of the report indicates not only a widespread ignorance
of the discoloration that attends dead bodies, but also the wide-spread,
if not paranoid, assumption that discolored corpses must have been killed
with poison gas. This will be, I believe, an important factor to consider
when evaluating Allied reports from the last days of the war. But finally,
the fears of the populace with regards to the danger of poison gas were
in a sense justified: although the fact was not publicized at the time,
many of the victims had died from carbon monoxide poisoning, which is,
after all, a poison gas.
1.7 Firestorms and Carbon Monoxide
Carbon monoxide
deaths were usually brought on by the fires set by the Allied bombers'
incendiary bombs. To grasp the widespread nature of such deaths, we
must first explain the nature of firestorms, which, in turn, will not
only explain the high incidence of carbon monoxide poisoning but also
some other seemingly fantastic claims pertaining to the victims of air
raids.
Graphic 1-15: Two Hamburg women who probably succumbed to carbon
monoxide.
Firestorms are
caused when a number of small fires converge into a single blaze, creating
a huge conflagration which in turn sucks in oxygen at high speeds and
at very high temperatures. In Hamburg, the conflagration eventually
enveloped 4 1/2 square miles, developed 100 mph winds [G110], and reached
temperatures of at least 600 to 800 degrees Centigrade [US19](other
firestorms have been said to generate temperatures of 1,500 to 2,000
degrees Centigrade). [H314] By way of comparison it should be noted
that startup temperatures for crematoria are between 600 and 700 degrees
Centigrade. [I262]
Under such conditions "flash
overs" or incidences of spontaneous combustion were not uncommon. [G103]
Several testimonies refer to people in the street or in apparent safety
in a park who would suddenly have their clothing burst into flames with
no apparent trigger by way of a spark. The same conditions could be
found in the cellars, many which were too hot to excavate until weeks
after the raid: when a cellar was reopened, it was not uncommon for
the inrush of oxygen to cause the remains of victims or coal and coke
supplies to burst into flames. [US23,G167]
Carbon monoxide gas played a major role in the fatalities, particularly
in incendiary raids, which were the type usually employed against population
centers. Although this development was unexpected, it was soon recognized
as the typical cause of death for those found in underground cellars
or bunkers. [US24f] It was also a frequent cause of death for aboveground
casualties, because the concentrations of the gas were so great in the
streets and because heart attacks and other pathologies could result
from exposure to less than lethal levels. [US24f] In Wesermunde, for
example, of 210 people killed in a fire caused by an air raid, 175 perished
from carbon monoxide poisoning. [US24] Of the victims of the Hamburg
raid, apart from mechanical injuries, 70% were poisoned with the lethal
gas. [US24] It should be noted that carbon monoxide would be generated
not only from incomplete combustion but also by exploding bombs: gas
from a high explosive shell would contain 60% to 70% carbon monoxide.
[US24] The Germans attempted to develop a number of tests that would
test carbon monoxide hemoglobin in corpses even after putrefaction.
The indications are simply astonishing: while CO levels of .5% can kill,
some bodies found in bomb shelters contained concentrations of up to
95%. [US25]
Aside from forensic tests, the
influence of the poisonous gas could usually be detected by inspecting
the posture of the remains. Because carbon monoxide is odorless, tasteless
and invisible, it is possible to inhale a lethal dose without knowing
it and then simply fall into a deep sleep. As a result most carbon monoxide
victims showed a relaxed and unthreatened posture when found: the death
was painless and came without any premonition. [US25] The authorities
faced a dilemma with the results of their surveys because there were
no effective preventive measures to take. As a result, the secret of
the CO poison gas threat was concealed from the public. [US25] The Strategic
Bombing Survey would report after the war:
In all the cities visited, carbon monoxide poisoning was regarded
as the primary cause of death or injury, sometimes reaching to as
much as 80% of all incendiary raid casualties. [US28]
As already suggested, cleanup after the raids
was a daunting proposition. Many of the dead were lying naked in the
streets, and it is known that many had stripped down to their shoes
to avoid flash over.
Graphic 1-16: A Hamburg casualty literally roasted by heat, not
flames.
Initially, the corpses
would swell, but after a few hours "the bodies shrunk to small objects
with hard brownish black skin and charring of different parts and frequently
to ashes and complete disappearance." [US22] This description, from
the US Strategic Bombing Survey, shows three photographs of shelter
dead, who have been between 50% to 80% cremated -- the presence of hair
and even clothing indicates that the destruction was achieved through
high heat alone, and not through exposure to flame. [US17-21,cf. Figs.
8,14-16]
Access to the shelters could take
months, and this would affect not only the body counts but also the
appearance of the remains. The lack of escape movements indicated carbon
monoxide poisoning in the absence of testing [US25]. The odor of putrefaction
was a frequent clue to the location of the dead, except in cases where
total cremation had occurred. [US23] Bodies were often found "lying
in a thick greasy black mass which was without doubt melted fat tissue."
[US23] The systematic shrinkage, probably caused by the burning which
removed the water mass, led the Germans to call such victims Bombenbrandschrumpfleichen
or "firebombshrunken bodies" [US23]. "Many basements contained only
bits of ashes and in these cases the number of casualties could only
be estimated." [US23] Of course, given the temperatures that are known
to have been achieved in the course of a firestorm none of these characterizations
should be surprising. As Gordon Musgrove, a highly decorated pilot for
Bomber Command, has noted:
"The enormous heat seems to have turned the cellars and underground
shelters into crematoria. The exits and emergency exits were surrounded
by fires; steel doors, specially installed as a safety precaution,
became red-hot or jammed; ceilings, weakened by excessive heat,
collapsed under the weight of falling masonry; and even when they
were not actually invaded by fire, many rooms were made untenable
by smoke or fumes." [G94]
Musgrove was at least half right. The inhabitants of the
shelters found themselves in the abnormal situation of hiding in their
basements while their buildings burned above them. As the intensive
heat dried them out and turned their faces puffy and red before heat
stroke set in, the deadly concentrations of carbon monoxide would slowly
and silently kill them. The cellars and underground shelters were both
crematoria and gas chambers combined.
END OF PART 1 --
TO PART 2
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